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NOTES AND NEWS.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON is at present under remand. In the debate on the Address on Tuesday last references were made in both Houses of Parliament to the disastrous, humiliating and costly war beyond the frontier, but the big debate on the subject is not expected to begin before Monday or Tuesday next. The amendment which is to be moved by Mr. Lawson Walton, one of the ablest lawyers and most effective speakers in the House, is in the following terms:—"As an Amendment to the Address, at end, add: 'And we humbly express to your Majesty our disapproval of the policy pursued in the permanent military occupation of Chitral and the maintenance and fortification of the road from Peshawar through the territory of the independent tribes, and deplore the consequences which have followed from that policy; and we further humbly represent to your Majesty that the safety and prosperity of your Majesty's Indian Empire will be best promoted by respecting the independence of the frontier tribes and avoiding the occupation of their territory.'" The amendment rightly places in the forefront the acts which the recently issued Blue-books almost succeed in ignoring—namely, the occupation of Chitral, and all that that disastrous blunder involved. We regret, however, that the amendment makes no reference to the question of a contribution from the British Exchequer to the cost of the war. That is a grave omission which Mr. Lawson Walton will no doubt be careful to set right in his speech, and it is to be presumed that Sir Henry Fowler, in view of his speeches during the recess, will strongly support the proposal that Parliament should follow the precedent set in the case of the second Afghan war.

The Indian Parliamentary Committee, which held its first meeting for this Session in the Conference Room of the House of Commons on Wednesday last, is, we are glad to see, concentrating its attention upon the policy of repression within as distinguished from the policy of aggression beyond the frontiers of India. Two amendments relating to this all-important matter have been placed upon the paper. One of them, standing in the name of Sir W. Wedderburn, M.P., the Chairman of the Indian Parliamentary Committee, is as follows:—

> As an amendment to the Address, at end, add:—"And humbly pray that Your Majesty, looking to the miseries patiently endured by the Indian people from famine, plague, poverty, and other afflictions during the past year, will graciously direct that special forbearance be shown towards them, and that careful enquiry be made into their present condition in order to restore confidence among the suffering masses, and thus prepare the way for healing measures tending to bring back peace and prosperity."

The other amendment stands in the name of Mr. Herbert Roberts, M.P., the Secretary to the Indian Parliamentary Committee:—

> As an amendment to the Address, at end, add:—"Humbly to assure Your Majesty that this House regards with grave concern the policy of internal repression lately adopted by the Government of India, and especially the deportation and continued imprisonment of British Indian subjects without trial, the recent series of Press prosecutions, and the present proposals to increase the severity of the law relating to sedition in India."

These two amendments, taken together, cover ground which is, to our thinking, not less, but more important even than the "forward" [illegible]licy. To obtain "clemency" for Mr. Tilak and the [illegible]ims of the recent Press prosecutions in India [illegible]e either the release or the judicial trial of the b[illegible]ers Natu, and to check the retrograde and oppressive changes which it is proposed to make in the Indian law of sedition—these are objects which deserve the best efforts not only of the Indian Parliamentary Committee, but of every statesman in Parliament to whatever political party he may owe allegiance.

On the eve of the opening of Parliament, Lord George Hamilton and his colleagues, by a characteristic manœuvre, issued a couple of bulky Blue-books upon what are very significantly called "*British* relations with the neighbouring tribes on *(sic)* the North-West frontier of India." We discuss the contents of these volumes elsewhere. But it is worth noting here that, as in the case of the earlier Chitral papers, the Conservative Government has published documents which its Liberal predecessors witheld. The motive is obvious enough. It is to create a diversion—to obscure the colossal blunder at Chitral by reference to Waziristan and the Durand agreement. This is unfair even to the point of absurdity. But it ought to be a lesson to the Liberal Front Bench. What, one wonders, did Sir Henry Fowler think of this passage in the *Standard's* leading article of Tuesday last:—

> The present policy of the Government of India, though it may be regarded as a development of that initiated by Lord Mayo, became what it is at a much later date. We need not go further back than the days when the Liberals were in office, and Sir Henry Fowler was Secretary of State for India. *For reasons which we will not stay to enquire into, that statesman was somewhat chary, when in office, of taking the world into his confidence;* but the correspondence now before us contains a very precise exposition of his sentiments, recorded in his own words.

The reference to the origin of the "forward" policy is, of course, grotesque. But the remark upon the policy of secrecy and silence pursued by Sir H. Fowler is, as readers of India are well aware, perfectly well warranted. Never was there a Secretary for India so difficult to approach and so sparing of information. One does not expect this attitude in a Liberal Minister, and we are revealing no secret when we say that Sir Henry Fowler's methods were so distasteful to a large number of Liberal members in the late Parliament as to cause them at one period to deliberate on the question whether, so long as he remained at the India Office, they could continue to support Lord Rosebery's Government. If the rather bitter experience through which the Liberal Front Bench is now passing enforces the moral that Liberals—even at the India Office—ought to be "thorough" and frank, the experience will not have been entirely regrettable.

The first, and perhaps the most important, despatch in the Blue-books comprises a joint Minute of Dissent (to which we refer on another page) signed by three civilian members of the Supreme Executive Council of India. If it be considered that the majority of four in that Council included the two military members, the weak legal member of that period, and the inexperienced Viceroy, the preponderating qualitative value of the minority is at once apparent. Is it possible to exaggerate the disadvantage under which Parliament is placed when such dissents by members of the Executive Council in India—as, also, dissents recorded in the Council of India here—are withheld until the subject-matter is too late except for repentance? The mischievous new departure taken by the Indian Government in 1894 could hardly have been followed by the criminal folly which has ensued—culminating in the cruel and disastrous Tirah campaign—had these State papers been placed before both Houses of Parliament three years ago. The invasion of Waziristan by the Indian Government was entered upon in October, 1894, and its disastrous results in the attack by the Waziris on Colonel Turner's camp at Wano were made known to all whom it concerned in the January issue of India, 1895, under the heading "The New Invasion of Afghanistan." This article was followed up by full

expositions from the pen of the late Mr. Dacosta and others, and by questions in Parliament. But those of our statesmen who affect to rule India were asleep. And now they are falling upon each other with recriminations, while independent members of Parliament (witness Sir L. McIver) declare that they have been betrayed by the Front Benches.

The confusion of tongues as to the cause of the war beyond the frontier still grows and multiplies among members of the Cabinet. The thing would be amusing if the matter were less grave. For example, the Queen's Speech, which is supposed to represent the united wisdom of the Cabinet, said on Tuesday that "on (*sic*) the North-Western borders of my Indian Empire, an organised outbreak of fanaticism" induced the tribes to rise. This is our old friend, the "spirit of unrest." So far, then, the cause of the war is not military occupation of the tribesmen's territory, but an outbreak of fanaticism. But now turn to Lord Salisbury's speech in the House of Lords on the same day. "I believe," he said, "that fanaticism has had a great deal to do with it, but I confess I think there has been a great deal more." And he went on to refer to the conflict between civilisation and barbarism. But conflict means contact, which occupation brings about. Again, Mr. Balfour, who is concerned to repudiate any connexion between the Government's Chitral policy and the war, menaced Sir W. Harcourt in the House of Commons with the proposition that "it was in the Tochi Valley that the first disturbances occurred." Mr. Balfour added that the front Opposition Bench would have to deal with the case of Waziristan, and so share the responsibility for the war. From all of which it appears (1) that the war was due to "an organised outbreak of fanaticism"; (2) that it was due to occupation of territory; (3) that it was *not* due to fanaticism; and (4) that it was *not* due to occupation of territory. We confess that, to put it mildly, we do not find this very "convincing."

We welcome these words of sense from the *Pall Mall Gazette* (February 9):—

Probably in his heart of hearts Lord George Hamilton cordially agrees with every word that fell from Sir Lewis McIver last night on the undue weight the high military authorities in India are allowed to have in the councils of the Indian Government. Sir Auckland Colvin long ago pointed out the difficulties and embarrassments thereby caused, and how the Finance Minister, who will have to find the ways and means, and knows not where to do so with a due regard to economy and justice to the taxpayer, is continually saddled with an expenditure he has not counted on, and disapproves. There can be no doubt that the mischief has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished, and we hope that Lord George Hamilton, if he has not done so already, will take steps to make it very clearly understood that the "high military mandarins," as Sir L. McIver calls them, who rule the roost at Simla, are henceforth to be kept within reasonable bounds. Punitive expeditions and campaigns beyond the frontier may be excellent things from the military point of view, but the Secretary of State will have to keep a closer eye on them in future. We cannot forget Sir George White's utterances at his farewell dinner at Simla, and probably they were in Sir L. McIver's mind when he spoke as he did.

That is the root of the matter, as we have always insisted. "Punitive expeditions and campaigns beyond the frontier may be excellent things from the military point of view, but the Secretary of State will have to keep a closer eye on them in future." But will he? Is Lord George Hamilton the man to do it? At present, at all events, he is talking about occupying "essential routes and positions"—the stock programme of the "forward" school—and Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords on Tuesday, though he rightly described every additional post as an additional danger and an additional evil, said: "I trust that we shall be able to perform what is an inevitable conquest by the gentle means of example and gradual intercourse." Let us once more recall Sir H. Fowler's admirable formula—that the duty of Liberals is to resist the forward policy "however disguised."

Damodar Chapekar has at length been found guilty of the murder of Lieutenant Ayerst and Mr. Rand, and sentenced to death. So ends, or ought to end, a deplorable chapter in the history of British India. Reuter has now discovered that "Chapekar's avocation is that of a mendicant Marathi singer, and he is almost illiterate." We seem to remember that in the excitement of a few months ago—the exact date was October 4 last—Reuter described him as "a Brahmin and an advocate of India." That is not the only misrepresentation which has now collapsed. After the verdict and sentence upon the confessed assassin, what becomes of the elaborate house of cards built up by Lord G. Hamilton last August? Let us recall his words (House of Commons, August 5):—

The murders were perpetrated, and they were cold-blooded murders, carefully thought out and deliberately planned. They were not the deeds of a fanatic smarting under some sense of supposed wrong. . . The two native gentlemen [*i.e.*, the brothers Natu] who had been arrested were notorious men. . . . He believed that the authorities of Bombay were within their rights in the action they had taken, and that the result of the proceedings would be to unravel the plot that had been formed.

Where is the "plot" to-day? And has it not turned out that Lord George Hamilton's hasty statement was precisely the reverse of the truth—in other words, that the murders *were* "the deeds of a fanatic smarting under some sense of supposed wrong"? Yet—and here is the crying injustice of it—the brothers Natu still remain imprisoned without trial, and Mr. Tilak, whose arrest was undoubtedly due to a theory that his journal had contributed to incite the murders, is still undergoing rigorous imprisonment. We hope that Lord George Hamilton will be promptly and severely questioned in the House of Commons upon what seems, on the face of it, a scandal and an outrage.

A Reuter's telegram, dated Calcutta, Wednesday, states that the proposals of the Government of India to amend the law relating to sedition are being "violently opposed by the Native Press, both English and vernacular, in Calcutta, and to a less extent in Bombay and Madras."

The majority of the public bodies which have given their opinions, including the Indian Association, the British India Association, the Anglo-Indian Defence Association, the Bombay Presidency Association, and the Bengal Chamber of Commerce criticise the measure, although the Bengal Chamber of Commerce expresses the opinion that some amendment of the sedition law is required.

So far as our reading of Indian newspapers goes, we do not see the least reason for suggesting that hostility to the proposed changes is less keen in Bombay and Madras than in Calcutta. Everywhere—occasionally even in the columns of Anglo-Indian journals—the ill-starred measure seems to be condemned. Reuter adds that "two of the principal Mahometan bodies—the Mahometan Literary Society and the Central National Mahometan Association—give their cordial approval." We confess to never having heard of these bodies before. Who are they? And whom do they represent? What we do know, however, is that owing to the indecent haste with which the Government of India is endeavouring to rush its proposals through, many of the representative public bodies in India have positively had to telegraph an abstract of their protests to the authorities.

The Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* despatched on February 4 (though the *Times* did not print until February 7) an account of the changes made by the Select Committee in the proposed amendments of the law of sedition. The changes do not, it would seem, amount to much. "Government" is defined as "Government as established by law in British India." There is a reduction of the maximum imprisonment under Section 124A. Also, the words "ill will" are omitted from the first "explanation," disaffection "being thus defined simply as including disloyalty and all feelings of enmity." A new explanation has further been added. What is more to the purpose is that the Mahárájá of Darbhanga and Mr. Ananda Charlu have recorded minutes of dissent, chiefly, it appears, on the paramount question of the meaning of disaffection. It is to be hoped that the full text of these important minutes will speedily be placed before the public both here and in India. The time within which action is possible is perilously short if it be the case, as the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* asserts, that "the Bill comes up for disposal a fortnight hence"—*i.e.*, on or about February 18!

It is gratifying to read the messages which his Excellency, the Viceroy of India, conveyed from the Queen Empress to the princes and people of India on the occasion of the New Year's investiture at Calcutta. Lord Elgin said:—

Her Majesty has charged [illegible] known to the Princes and Chiefs of her Indian Empi[illegible] sense of the loyalty and devotion with which they have [illegible] services of their troops and the resources of their States in [illegible] emergency. I have had

no previous opportunity of making known in public Her Majesty's commands, but it gives me special pleasure to do so now in the presence of a chief who, not for the first time, has shown his readiness at a moment's notice to give the Government most valuable assistance. The Mahárájá Scindhia will forgive me if I say a word of an incident which perhaps attracted less public attention than it deserved. Public spirit we expect from His Highness, and knowing his energy we were not surprised to find him accompanying his men to the banks of the Indus, where their work was to commence; but I can never forget how then, without a word of remonstrance, the Mahárájá turned his back on the military operations in which it was the dearest wish of his heart to share, to resume his place in that battle from which he has now I trust emerged triumphant—the battle with scarcity, in which my distinguished friends the Mahárájás of Rewah, Benares, and Darbhanga, have nobly shared, and have proved themselves champions and protectors of their people.

His Excellency added :—

And if Her Majesty has throughout sympathised with us she has also felt deeply the sympathy which in all loyalty and respect we have offered. I desire to give this message from the last letter I had the honour to receive in Her Majesty's own words :—"The Queen-Empress wishes to say how much she is touched and gratified by the immense number of very loyal and kind addresses sent by the Princes and people of India in such beautiful cases and caskets, and she would wish the Viceroy to state openly what she has said above."

Yet, what is the return which the people of India are now to receive for the loyalty of forty years? To say nothing of vindictive prosecutions and vindictive sentences, the official acknowledgment of the loyalty of the Indian people has now taken shape in three concrete Bills: (1) a Bill to gag the Press by modifying the criminal law of India; (2) a Bill to amend the Criminal Procedure Code so as to cripple the powers of the High Court, and to make the strong Executive stronger; and (3) a Bill, about to be introduced in the Bengal Council, to deprive the elected Municipal Commissioners of Calcutta of their controlling powers.

The extracts which we have from time to time quoted have shown that the Gagging Act is universally condemned by the Native Indian Press, while it scarcely receives the support even of the Anglo-Indian Press. Let us recall here some remarks from the *Madras Times*, a journal edited by an Englishman :—

The Bill "*Stupidissimus ac Stultissimus*" by which the Government propose to stultify the Press, but by means of which they may seriously expect to stultify themselves, is in the waiting condition, and we may hope that the Government will not really bring such a monstrosity into being. It is a timorous exhibition of weakness to seek to stifle criticism. . . . Better to hear a seditiously-minded people crying sedition aloud than to have them crying out "God Save the Queen" and secretly undermining her Government. We are not disposed to believe that there is any such folly as seditious spirit abroad in India—or, at any rate, we believe that there is no sedition that the Government need be so much afraid of as to be passing a retrograde law for its own protection.

The same writer observes that the people of India want progress, while Anglo-Indian journalists, followed humbly by the Anglo-Indian Government, will not hear of progress :—

The people of India, like the people of every respectable country under the sun, desire to progress in their own country, and that they *must* progress is a truth that history preaches. The history of other nations should teach us to be wise in our own generation, and to make India's progress ours, rather than by retrograde movements to seek to bottle up the nation's spirit till it bursts. . . . The passing of the present Bill will, we verily believe, be of disastrous tendency for British rule. A retrograde movement is always regrettable, even when there is a necessity for a retreat; in the present case there is no necessity save in the timid imaginations of a timid Government. In the second place, the spirit of the people is thoroughly roused against such a measure; and finally it must surely be evident to most people that what is practically an attempt to tame the people and the Press into a hang-dog equanimity for anything that the Government may choose to do or say is a miserable policy.

The Madras Municipality, says the *Hindu*, has done good work during the year 1896-97, and the Government Order bears testimony to its efficiency. The sanitary improvements of the town are specially recognised, and the Government "notes with satisfaction the preventive measures taken by the Commissioners against the bubonic plague." Needless to say, most of the Commissioners are natives of Madras. Yet it is difficult to persuade some people that Indians will work zealously for progress even when confidence is reposed in them.

The Calcutta Municipality has also done excellent work from year to year. Calcutta to-day is not the city it was under the "Justices" of the old system. But in these days of repression and retrograde legislation it is rumoured that the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal is about to introduce a Bill which will virtually bring the representative system to an end. The *Bengali* believes that a general committee, consisting of twelve members, will be invested with all executive power, and will be practically independent of the Commissioners. We hope that it is not yet too late to ward off this mischief.

The practice of segregating women in plague-camps continues to provoke alarm in India. Indeed it appears to be creating greater irritation and apprehension than anything that has happened since the incident of the greased cartridges in 1857. The circumstances surrounding the murder of Mr. Rand and Lieutenant Ayerst, last year, and the riot attended by the murder of a hospital assistant near Nassik this year, are terrible indications of the state of feeling which may be brought about even by the most heroic and well-meant efforts. One is driven once more to ask the question: Is not home-segregation possible? Is it not possible to take adequate precautions against plague without adopting a system which is revolting to the Oriental mind?

In this connexion we may refer to the *Indian Daily News*, a Calcutta newspaper edited by an Englishman, whose remarks are well worthy of attention :—

Probably there is no subject more upsetting the minds of the natives of India at the present moment, than the proposed plague regulations as to segregation—regulations which remind one that Pythagoras and Disraeli both said that the basis of success is silence. In the Bombay Presidency, where the purdah system is not so universal, the enforcement of them has caused a good deal of discontent: in the Punjab, it has caused practical difficulties. Near Jullundur, the other day, a Rajput village was discovered where the women refused to budge, and the officer had to refer to Lahore for orders. In the North-Western Provinces, Sir Anthony MacDonnell has, we believe, seen the enormous practical difficulty of removing forcibly the women of forty million people, and the feelings of the people on the subject decided not to adopt segregation. At Patna, at Gya and other places in Behar, the people, on the mere issuing of the plague notification, have bolted from the towns, and the chief movers in the matter were the women. The precise words of the notification do not particularly matter in these affairs, and the notification has created a scare which is prevailing throughout every district of India. It may be that the effect of the proposed rules is grossly exaggerated; but the scare and terror are very real.

The *Indu Prakash* of Bombay, commenting upon an agricultural riot in Gujarat, says :—

Chaklasa is a small town in Gujarat, probably beyond the influence of that wicked Sarvajanik Sabha which was refused by the Government the right to make representations in public matters. But we are told that a serious riot took place there, two policemen were killed, three or four were wounded, and the Mamlatdar was roughly handled, and a company of the 4th Rifles had to be requisitioned from Ahmednagar. What is at the bottom of this riot no one knows. Probably it was due, as the *Times of India* says, to Government asking the rayats to pay the land revenue in one instalment instead of two, or it may be due to the revised land settlements as the *Bombay Gazette* reports; or it may be due to both. One thing is certain, that there must have been a certain amount of discontent in the land.

The time, we hope, is not distant when more attention will be given by the controlling authorities to revenue settlements in India. They have, we are convinced, more to do with the poverty and dissatisfaction of the masses, and with the recurrence of famines, than is generally supposed.

"The public are aware," says the *Mahratta*, "that the observance of racial distinction between Natives and Europeans had already grown to be so invidious and insulting that it had to be made the subject of an interpellation in a recent sitting of the Bombay Legislative Council. The public are also aware that his Excellency had promised that thereafter quarantine rules would be enforced so as to minimise the distinction as far as possible. But it must now be said, though it may seem strange, that his Excellency was counting without his host. We have reason to believe that the invidious distinction is being still maintained in all its insulting aspects. Only lately a remarkable case is reported to have occurred in Bombay. Mr. Justice Buddrudin Tyabji and one of his European subordinates were the other day travelling by rail. Both of them had come from Matheran, armed with the same certificates and passports. But while Mr. Justice Tyabji was detained for inspection, his European subordinate with native servants, was allowed to pass without detention." Can this allegation be true? It seems incredible.

THE NEMESIS OF CHITRAL.

It requires a broad historical sense and a considerable sense of humour to read the proceedings in Parliament on the first night of the Session without indignation and regret, bordering on despair. The Queen's Speech is degraded to puerility by the attribution of the present troubles on the frontier to "an organised outbreak of fanaticism"—a substitution, as we show elsewhere, of the occasion for the cause. Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir Neville Chamberlain, on the Tory reversal of the Liberal policy of withdrawal from the Chitral line, at once pointed out that here was a new departure in the working out of the baneful forward policy, and at the same time predicted the consequences with as accurate truth as if the later facts had lain historically before them. Lord Kimberley, in the course of the debate, declared that he "could not for a moment doubt that the maintenance of the Chitral road had had a most serious effect in causing this terrible rising." He went on to say that he found "striking proof" of this view in the very papers which the Government put forward in disproof of it. The very first sentence of the undated letter "from the Mulla of Adda to all the Mullas and elders of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes" shows the fundamental cause: "Kafirs have taken possession of all Mussulman countries, and owing to the lack of spirit on the part of the people, are conquering every region." Lord Kimberley asked pointedly: "Can anyone who reads that extract doubt that this was one of the chief causes by which the Mullas persuaded the tribes to rise?" Nobody has ever denied that there may have been other causes, fanaticism pure and simple included, but every fair-minded critic must agree with Lord Kimberley when he says, "that it was one of the most real and important causes I have not the remotest doubt." Further, Major Deane, the political agent for Dir and Swat, wrote to the Foreign Secretary of India on August 5, 1897: "It has been the chance of this Fakir being found to start the business that brought about the rising." But there is another point. On June 13, 1896, more than a year before the rising, Major Deane reported the perverse attitude of the local tribesmen in bringing in short and bad supplies, and in hampering him through refusal or reluctance to do necessary work upon that precious road about whose origin Lord George Hamilton is so hopelessly confused. Major Deane added the significant words: "These are minor points; but *they are a warning as to what we may expect at any time*." On July 26, 1897, he reported the advance of "a local gathering of 500 to 1,000 ill-armed men in Swat Valley, excited by religious preaching of a mad Fakir." Lord George Hamilton transforms this rag-tag and bobtail crowd into "*well*-armed" men, but that is a detail. A telegram to the Viceroy next morning says the "troops were prepared, notice having been received from absconding levies." Yet such was their state of preparation that they allowed this absurd gathering of "ill-armed men," led by "a mad Fakir," to set the whole frontier ablaze. The real fanaticism seems to have been on the British side.

The responsibility, then, clearly lies upon the present Government, who insisted on the occupation of Chitral, and all that that involved, under the ridiculous delusion that the tribesmen were welcoming us with open arms. Suppose we take it that the rising never extended more then ten miles along the Chitral road, as Mr. Balfour asserted—though Mr. Balfour's knowledge of distances had to be corrected by Sir Henry Fowler—what does that matter? The strength of the chain is the strength of the weakest link; and if the road be broken at any point, it is broken, and the object of it is defeated. What is the good of talking about the abandonment of friendly allies? The whole suggestion is an airy hypothesis, which Mr. Balfour's intellect is quite subtle enough to estimate at its true value. Mr. Balfour had no need to menace his opponents with the assurance that the debate on Mr. Lawson Walton's motion will not be confined to Chitral. Sir William Harcourt, in his spirited and able speech, had left his adversary no illusions on that score. Sir William was listened to with quiet attention up to the Indian portion of his speech, but as he tackled the forward policy, the excitement grew upon the House, until his emphatic denunication of it as "a dangerous and an unjust policy" raised Liberal enthusiasm to a climax. We have noted elsewhere that Sir George White, the Commander-in-Chief, dissented from the resolution of the Viceroy's Council against the permanent occupation of Tirah—a fact that sheds a good deal of light upon the real processes of frontier policy. Sir William Harcourt brought up for drastic comment Sir George White's hectoring speech at Simla, in the course of which the orator declared that "civilisation and barbarism cannot exist side by side and at the same time peaceably as independent neighbours." "What is the use of your talking of respecting the independence of the tribes," asked Sir William Harcourt indignantly, "when language of that character is held by the man who is Commander-in-Chief of the armies of India?" Sir George White "demands disarmament and control." Disarmament is simply impracticable; and, if it were practicable and carried out, the wretched people would just starve. Control, in the sense of the forward school, is equally impracticable; we have neither the men nor the means of an "effective" occupation. Control is impossible, except from the outside, by patience and discretion, and by blockade in case of last necessity. All this we have already discussed and illustrated by historical examples of success. Sir William Harcourt did excellent service by pointing out that the like sentiments find expression also in high quarters in England. "Where the British soldier has gone," said Mr. Balfour in airy triumph after the Tory success at the polls in 1895, "there he shall remain." Recent experience has toned down that boast, but the spirit that prompted it too surely remains. Mr. Balfour told Sir William Harcourt that, on Mr. Lawson Walton's motion, Sir William will have to deal "not only with what is urged on this (the Government) side, but with some of his most distinguished colleagues on that (the Opposition) bench." And so, depend upon it, Sir William will. We have already anticipated him, to some preliminary extent, in another column.

The real essence of the matter, however, is not to be lost sight of in gladiatorial displays on either side of the House. There was no part of the debate more effective or to the real point than the extremely weighty speech delivered from the Government side by Sir Lewis McIver. Sir Lewis is a strong Unionist, but he has had personal experience of India, and he is a fair-minded and able man. He took up the position of the National Congress, the position that we ourselves have consistently occupied, and pleaded for the adoption of a judicial attitude. That is just what is sorely needed—a judicial attitude. India, we are constantly reminded, must not be thrown into the arena of party recriminations. Very good; but then each party must observe the conditions of the game. The fundamental mischief lies in the India Office. True, the Governor-General, especially if he be an able man, possesses a very free hand; but otherwise he is certain, and in any case he is not unlikely, to be controlled and overborne by the urgency of military representations from some Commander-in-Chief or Military Secretary, who may be the finest soldier in the world, but yet a mere child in political knowledge and capacity. The Secretary of State, again, may be a man of very ordinary capacity, or a man who comes temporarily to the office with no previous grasp of Indian questions and Indian conditions. In that case, he is certain to be controlled and overborne either by the India Council or by military advisers outside the Council. But for Sir Henry Fowler's lack of special knowledge and experience of Indian affairs, there would have been no Waziri expedition. But for Lord George Hamilton's strength of intellect and his social predispositions, there would have been no recent campaigning. The Prime Minister cannot play the whole game off his own bat, and Lord Salisbury has been overburdened by his own special departments. His remarks in the debate do not really count. It thus comes about that the military enthusiasts, whose opinion on a point of policy, as Sir Lepel Griffin justly insisted the other day, ought neither to be asked nor accepted, overbear the titular chiefs both in Calcutta and at Westminster. There could be no more telling illustration of this deplorable weakness in the system than the prolonged and harassing battle that Lord Lawrence had to wage against the forward policy—even Lord Lawrence, who was entitled to speak not only as a civilian but also as a military expert, and had much more personal authority than any other Governor-General since Warren Hastings. The last appeal lies to the constituencies. It is, therefore, extremely gratifying to find a member of Sir Lewis McIver's ability, experience, and political convictions, coming for-

ward independently and imprecating a plague on Front Bench methods. "In Indian matters," he roundly declared, "both Front Benches are past praying for." There is but too much truth in the general allegation. The real objective of both parties, if they only had the sense to see it and the individual grit to act up to their judgment, is—"the high military mandarins." There is a glint of hope in the evident impression that Sir Lewis McIver's speech made upon the House. If such sound views as Sir Lewis urged upon Parliament could only be impressed upon the electorate in Great Britain and Ireland, there might yet be a reasonable anticipation of bright days for India—and for England.

TWO BELATED BLUE-BOOKS.

On the day before the re-opening of Parliament there were published—at length and at last—a couple of Blue-books on the "Military Operations on (*sic*) the North-West Frontier of India." The first volume deals with Waziristan (July, 1894, to November, 1897) and with Kohat Salt (September and November, 1897). The second volume contains a "selection" of telegrams and certain correspondence relating to Malakand, Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, etc.; the telegrams running from July last to January 25, 1898, and the correspondence from July, 1896, to the end of January last. The *Standard* is gratified with the fulness of the information furnished to eager politicians. But our contemporary is very easily pleased. There is, we fancy, a memorandum of Field-Marshal Sir Donald Stewart's on the Chitral section of the business that would have filled an eminently useful page. But it is conspicuous by its absence. The supporters of the Government in the Press, taking the cue from Ministerial speakers during the recess, have steadily emphasised an alleged substantial agreement of Tory and Liberal policy; and even leading Liberal editors have played into their hands by reiterated assertion that the forward policy is dead. The *Times* and the *Standard* reach the acme of Tory-Liberal fusion in their comments on these two Blue-books. Says the *Standard* (February 8):—

> The present policy of the Government of India, though it may be regarded as a development of that initiated by Lord Mayo, became what it is at a much later date. We need not go further back than the days when the Liberals were in office and Sir Henry Fowler was Secretary of State for India. For reasons that we will not stay to inquire into, that statesman was somewhat chary, when in office, of taking the world into his confidence; but the correspondence now before us contains a very precise exposition of his sentiments, recorded in his own words. From this it will be seen to what extent a Liberal Ministry had pledged itself to the policy afterwards adopted by the party now in power. That is a point to which the attention of the Opposition may be cordially invited.

With little less ignorance and with equal audacity, the *Times* put forward the like view (February 8):

> Not the least gratifying circumstance brought out by the papers now made public is that the policy of successive Governments at home has been to a large extent continuous in principle in regard to these frontier troubles.

The point on which the continuity of policy is alleged to hinge is the fact that Sir Henry Fowler sanctioned the Waziri expedition. For ourselves, we protested over and over again against that act of policy, and we have never been more tender with Sir Henry Fowler than with Lord George Hamilton. We are glad to find that three members of the Viceroy's Council so eminent as Sir Charles Pritchard, Sir James Westland, and Sir Antony Macdonnell recorded their emphatic dissent. Why did we not learn this fact years ago? The knowledge of such important dissents would have greatly strengthened the hands of those who regard this forward policy with abhorrence. Both parties, we regret to say, are equally blameworthy in delaying the publication of important facts. The Waziristan blunder arose out of (1) the gratuitous assumption that the Durand Treaty laid upon us obligations incapable of fulfilment without "an effective control of Waziristan," and (2) the mistaken conception that such control could be exercised otherwise than by enforcing a blockade when necessary—for blockade is the only way, short of an expedition, of bringing the tribesmen to their bearings. But, after all, what is to be said of the fairness of controversialists who deliberately forget that the recent and existing difficulties grew, not out of Waziristan, but out of Chitral, from which the Liberal Ministry had definitively withdrawn? Again, what ignorant or deliberate, and in either case scandalous, misleading of the British public is it to date the Tory forward policy from the time of Lord Mayo, to say nothing of Sir Henry Fowler? The forward policy began with Lord Auckland, and the lessons of the first Afghan war and the resolution of Lord Lawrence prevented its revival till Lord Salisbury, no doubt under the influence of the oriental imagination of Lord Beaconsfield, despatched Lord Lytton for the express purpose. Since that date the tendency of Liberal action has in the main been strongly against it, and the almost complete tendency of Tory action has been for it. The writer in the *Standard* tries to turn the position by the amazing assertion that "the principles which guided Sir John Lawrence no longer hold good." Such an astounding statement in a leading organ of public opinion in London is enough to show how very far the forward policy is from being dead.

Lord George Hamilton's despatch, summarising the position, is in the last degree feeble and inconclusive. He traces the causes of the present troubles. They may be summed up in one word—Fanaticism. Sensible observers have often and again scouted this explanation, and, with these Blue-books before them, they must do so again. Of course, the "mad fakir" and the "mad mulla"—several of them—were there, and did their best to influence the people. The documents now published, however, show, if they show anything—(1) how desperately hard a job of it these mad religionists had; and (2) how admirably the occupation of the territory of the tribesmen supplied them with a text. The documents show as clearly as possible that the mad mullas might have exploded with enthusiasm, and all in vain, had it not been for the opportunities offered to them by the presence of British forces in the country. The nimblest cat cannot run up a wall, however eager to catch the bird on the top of it, unless it has something to hold on by. First, the tribesmen were irritated and perplexed by the Durand Delimitation Commission. Well, of course. The Viceroy and the Amír settled the matter without so much as "by your leave" to the tribesmen; and how is it to be supposed that they would receive the Commission with open arms and without suspicion and resentment? Again, in the Tochi valley, there occurred what Lord George Hamilton calls a "dastardly attack." Why did it occur? Lord George Hamilton, a few lines earlier, himself assigns an absolutely sufficient reason, though he, of course, sees the facts in the light of a different interpretation. He says: "In 1896, steps were taken to establish permanent military posts in the Tochi valley." Very well. The tribesmen don't want these posts, and we establish them at our peril. Further, in the Swat Valley, Lord George Hamilton himself admits, the pretensions of "'the mad fakir' were at first disputed by the Mianguls of Swat"—who, let us say parenthetically, are grandsons of the late Akhund—"and by other chiefs of the tribes." It may be, indeed, that "the mad fakir" and his followers struck the first blow at Malakand and Chakdara. But that was only the occasion, and not the cause, of the mischief. What business had we in those positions 4,000 strong? If the Liberal policy had not been reversed, we should not have been there, and "the mad fakir" would have had nothing to work upon. So with the Afridis: if you set the houses afire right and left of them, is it not the most natural thing in the world that they should take steps to save themselves? It is as plain as possible that if we let the tribesmen alone, the frontier will be perfectly quiet. A sentence or two from the dissenting minute of Sir Charles Pritchard, Sir James Westland, and Sir Antony Macdonnell will indicate how things work, and Sir Henry Fowler, in the Waziristan affair, ought to have seen it:—

> It is noteworthy that almost all the Waziri offences enumerated in the list attached to the despatch were committed on or near the portion of the Waziristan border which marches with the Zhob district recently annexed to Baluchistan. If these offences may be regarded —and we think that, to some extent at all events, they may be reasonably regarded—as evidence of irritation felt by the Waziris at the advance of the British frontier in that direction, then the inference is that much greater irritation will be felt at the establishment of military posts inside Waziristan, and still more at an advance to the boundary of Afghanistan.
>
> It is evident that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab does not anticipate any great difficulties *if our establishments are kept within our present frontier line, and if, at the same time, due precautions are taken to prevent the provocation of collisions with the tribesmen and to moderate the ardour of those of our civil and military officers who are eager for an*

advance. To our reading, Mr. Bruce's letter conveys the same lesson.

The future is bound to be as full of trouble as the past unless the Government give up the insane notion of establishing forts and roads in the tribal districts. The wisdom of the commander-in-chief, Sir George White, may be gauged by his dissent from the resolution of the Viceroy's Council not to hold Tirah. But the obvious point is that we must abstain absolutely from aggression upon tribal territory. We are bound in certain contingencies to defend Afghanistan — a very unfortunate obligation traceable to this same forward policy. Still, the tribes are not likely to object to our using the Khyber for such a special purpose, the full meaning of which could readily be brought home to them by the Amír. In any case, they will be less hostile to us when the unfortunate time comes, the more rigidly we in the meantime leave them to their own devices. It is merely throwing dust in the eyes of Parliament and the public to talk about the worries of tribal aggression on British Indian territory. Is it not the fact that the old frontier policy steadily reduced the number and the seriousness of aggressions? The tribesmen were hungry, and the frontier officers devised work and markets to obviate their poverty, and thereby stopped their marauding? Is it not the fact that during Lord Ripon's Viceroyalty there was not a single punitive expedition? Our policy must content itself without selected forts and communications, otherwise there will be no cessation of these shameful expeditions, and no rest for India. The root ideas of Lord George Hamilton, so far from making for peace and contentment, as his friends in the Press so glibly assure the public, are, on the contrary, of the very essence of the forward policy. Unless this bottom fact be fully recognised by Parliament and the constituencies, our last state on the frontier will be worse than the first. India cannot afford many more of these cruel and abortive "punitive expeditions."

THE DREAD OF ENQUIRY.

WHEN a man, suffering under a wrong for which the law provides a remedy, chooses to submit to the wrong rather than make public suit against his aggressor, the ordinary plain Englishman does not impute to him an excess of Christian charity, but rather a well-founded dread of publicity. When the Indian Government, which is admittedly in severe financial straits, and which has been loud and persistent in its claim that its financial difficulties are absolutely unavoidable, rejects a proffered grant from the Imperial Government, and sets up the plea that the making and receiving of such grants constitute a breach of sound financial policy, what are we to suppose is the hidden motive for this self-denying ordinance? We do not think that the question is a difficult one to answer. Attached to any grant of Imperial money is a condition—for Governments in default an onerous and a deterring condition—and that is, the satisfaction of the inconvenient curiosity of the British taxpayer. An Imperial grant, such as that which was offered to India, would be money voted —not formally and perfunctorily and listlessly, as on Indian Budget nights—but after keen debate and searching questions, involving a strict enquiry into the expenditure which called for the grant in aid, and into the policy which brought about that expenditure. The House of Commons does not vote away the money of its constituents in the dark, no matter how ready it may be to sanction the squandering of the resources of the Indian taxpayer. The money, it is true, might be given immediately to meet India's pressing need; but while the British people would give cheerfully—even the Chancellor of the Exchequer says so in terms which are positively effusive for the keeper of the public purse—they would give inquisitively. *Hinc illae lacrimae.* Hence this sudden modesty on the part of the Indian Government, hence also its new-born enthusiasm for sound financial policy.

It cannot be said that we are making any unwarrantable assumptions in attributing to the Indian authorities fear of enquiry as the compelling motive in the highly suggestive policy which they have elected to pursue. The *Pioneer* of Allahabad, which is the official mouthpiece of the Government of India in the Anglo-Indian Press, makes this very objection to the proposed grant. The interference of Parliament is a thing which the Government of India in India has in horror. Parliament, to the average Anglo-Indian mind, is that meddlesome body which occupies itself gratuitously and unnecessarily with the affairs of the Empire. And though these views are not always expressed in this bold fashion, they are to be read between the lines of every official or semi-official commentary on matters which are both of Imperial and of Indian concern. But if there is this visible dread of enquiry appearing on the surface of the Indian Government's renunciation, is not this very fear of the bureaucracy the weightiest of all possible reasons for holding that enquiry forthwith? Of course it is not necessary to force a grant in aid upon a reluctant Government, though the apparently insignificant question of the needs of the Indian taxpayer might reasonably be allowed to override these false scruples—false, we assert, in more senses than one. But grant or no grant, the policy of the *Pioneer*, which is the admission of the Indian bureaucracy, points conclusively to the need for enquiry. The matter really amounts to a discreet defiance of Parliament's authority, to an evasion —palpable and confessed—of Parliament's proper control of the policy which should direct the servants of the State in all questions that affect the welfare of the British Empire as a whole. For the very foundation of our North-West frontier policy in India is the possibility of a struggle with Russia: and all men are agreed that though the main incidents of that struggle might take place on the borders of India, the struggle itself would be one for the hegemony of Asia, possibly, nay certainly, involving England's very existence as a great world-power. We are agreed, as all sane Englishmen are agreed, that what is necessary must be done, and that British policy on the North-West frontiers of India must be such as will conduce to the safety of the Empire, be the cost what it may. But we, in common with most Englishmen, are tired of the many costly failures of the Indian Government to deal with this problem. It is clear to-day, if it was never clear before, that the task, whether of framing a successful policy or of meeting the financial strain involved, is one beyond the strength of the Government of India. And now, when that Government and its apologists openly scout investigation, foregoing to that end a much-needed Imperial grant, the time has come when Parliament should assert its authority, enquire into the causes of repeated failure, ease the burden on the Indian taxpayer, and deal with a question of grave Imperial concern with the finality which is only possible to the highest authority in the Empire.

Apart from the conspicuous failure which has hitherto attended the efforts of the Indian Government in carrying out its frontier policy, there is one very practical consideration which must not be lost sight of. The present financial need may be tided over by liberal recourse to loans. Future crises may to some extent be alleviated by the same unhappy expedient. But sooner or later, if present policies prevail, India must come upon Great Britain for financial assistance. As we showed last week, £75,000,000 have been expended on these frontiers in the last twenty years. India simply cannot afford this war-tax over and above her already heavy payments for ordinary military requirements. What country could? The question then is not so much whether, as when the British Government shall seriously occupy itself with this matter. Surely it is better to do so now when the opportunity offers, when public interest is aroused, and when India's need is urgent, than to defer it to some distant day when the needs of a bankrupt Indian Government may prove a very serious drain upon the resources of the Empire, at a time when all those resources may have to be called up to meet other and even heavier responsibilities.

TRANS-FRONTIER POLICY.[1]

GENERAL Sir John Adye has the great advantage of speaking from personal experience when he treats of the North-West border territories. His not infrequent contributions to the Press during the last few years when the Forward Policy has been unusually rampant have been characterised by knowledge and sound judgment. The present sketch of the history of that policy must be

[1] "Indian Frontier Policy: An Historical Sketch." By General Sir John Adye, G.C.B., R.A. With a map. (London: Smith, Elder, and Co.)

regarded as a timely addition to the popular literature of the subject. It deals in short compass, and in a plain and lucid manner, with the main outline of events, deliberately avoiding detail; and it can be grasped, with moderate attention, in an hour or two. The accompanying map is a very good map as far as it goes, but it hardly goes far enough. It is limited to the area of frontier disturbance in the campaigns of 1895-97. We think it should have covered the whole period of which the book treats, and should therefore have included Baluchistan and Sind at least. There is no dubious ring in General Adye's conclusions. He disapproves the Forward Policy utterly, from its inception down to the present hour, at the same time marking the cause and the effect in its disastrous course of development. The sketch should be widely read and carefully considered. In that case, it ought to help materially in exploding the pernicious nonsense about the danger of a Russian or any other invasion, and about the forward method of meeting such danger as may actually exist either from Russia or from Afghanistan, or even from the local tribes.

The visionary plan concocted by Napoleon and the Emperor of Russia at Tilsit was brushed away by the treaty of Teheran in 1809; and nearly a generation of tranquillity succeeded. While the English, however, were consolidating their power in India, intrigue and conflict continued to simmer in Persia, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. It was not till 1836 that the Government of India gave itself any serious concern as to what was doing beyond the mountains. In that year Burnes was despatched "on a commercial mission" to Kabul, where Dost Mahomed reigned. A "commercial" mission is the diplomatic designation of a "political" mission. But Burnes and the Amír failed to see eye to eye, for the Amír could not obtain any *quid pro quo* that he really wanted; and at the moment of divergence there appeared at Kabul a Russian envoy, named Vicovitch, also on a "commercial" mission, which included an offer of Russian money and assistance to the Amír against the Sikhs. Burnes, unfortunately, had more conceit than humour, otherwise he would have laughed Vicovitch out of the field. On the contrary, he returned to India in 1838, his mission a dead failure. Meantime, the Shah of Persia, under Russian promptings, had laid siege to Herat; and, as Kaye writes, "far out in the distance, beyond the mountains of the Hindu Kush, there was the shadow of a great Northern army, tremendous in its indistinctness, sweeping across the wilds and deserts of Central Asia towards the frontiers of Hindustan.' The siege of Herat was raised in consequence of the defence so splendidly directed and animated by Eldred Pottinger, who happened to be holidaying in the city in the guise of a horse-dealer. The frightful army looming in the distance was a very mirage of the desert. It was the expedition of Perovsky against Khiva, and it promptly disappeared beneath the snowy wastes of the Barzuk Desert, north of the Aral.

When the Indian expedition sent by Lord Auckland to make the first Afghan war was ready to move, the essential grounds for its despatch had thus melted away. Still, Dost Mahomed must be whipped, and the expedition advanced. Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief, said: "Every advance you make beyond the Sutlej, in my opinion, adds to your military weakness"; and he resigned the command, and was succeeded by Sir John Keane from Bombay. Expert opinion in England was equally decisive and weighty. The Duke of Wellington said: "Our difficulties will commence where our military successes end"; and "The consequences of crossing the Indus once, to settle a Government in Afghanistan, will be a perennial march into that country." The Marquess Wellesley condemned "the folly of occupying a land of rocks, sands, deserts, and snows." Sir Charles Metcalfe protested: "Depend upon it, the surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves is for us to cross the Indus and meddle with the countries beyond it." And so forth. "What!" Lord William Bentinck exclaimed, "Auckland and Macnaghten gone to war! The last men in the world I should have suspected of such folly." Auckland was a quiet, reserved man, of no particular ability. Macnaghten's experience had been purely legal, mainly as Registrar of the High Court of Appeal. Henry Torrens, who used to boast that "he had made the Afghan war," was a courtly under-secretary in the Foreign Office, invaluable at five o'clock tea and official dances. John Colvin was Auckland's private secretary, These were the men whose influence overbore the experience of such men as the Commander-in-Chief. They, too, of course were supposed to have Indian experience, and experience of a kind they had. "Experience," Sir Charles Napier put it in his caustic way, "Yes; but in doing things wrong." How completely and disastrously wrong was proved conclusively in the Kabul massacre at the close of 1841, and in the arrival of the solitary Dr. Brydon at Jelalabad on January 13th, 1842, the one Englishman who directly escaped the destruction of the British force. As now, so then, there was no lack of British strategy or gallantry; "the causes of our failure," as General Adye says, "were due throughout far more to rash and mistaken policy than to any shortcomings of the British troops engaged."

This was a tolerably smart lesson, and it was long laid to heart. The policy of keeping on our own side of the hills, which has been especially associated with the name of Lord Lawrence, though it was no invention of his, was very steadily pursued for some forty years. The infamous second Afghan War of 1878, in Lord Lytton's viceroyalty, may very fairly be traced to the oriental imagination of Disraeli, although General Adye makes no mention of that political adventurer. The real cause was the Russian advance in Central Asia; the ostensible cause was the absurd allegation of contumacy, and the lying allegation of disloyalty and hostility, against the Amír Shere Ali. The Russian bugbear was sufficiently ridiculous. Sir Henry Rawlinson's scheme, as General Adye points out, "ignores distances, blots out mountains, deserts, and arid plains of Persia and Afghanistan, and takes no account of the war-like races who would bar the path," nor yet, he might have added, of the hopelessness of providing commissariat and transport. The Home Government deliberately manufactured a quarrel with Shere Ali, and forced the Government of India to adopt it and carry it through. The peace of forty years was first disturbed by the Secretary for India's peremptory despatch of January 22, 1875, to Lord Northbrook; and that Secretary for India was Lord Salisbury. The Indian Government, in amazement, temporized, and argued stoutly against the project. They tided over a year, and in April, 1876, Lord Northbrook resigned, and was succeeded by Lord Lytton, the willing instrument of Disraeli. There is a very remarkable break in the correspondence between Calcutta and Westminster, extending from February 28, 1876, to May 10, 1877. In 1876, the second Afghan expedition was launched. It overran the country and dictated terms. But Sir Louis Cavagnari and his escort were murdered as Burnes and Macnaghten had been, and the Afghan apples turned to dust in the British mouth. At the close of the great war of 1878-80, says General Adye, "we had over 70,000 men in Afghanistan, or on the border in reserve; and even then we really only held the territory within range of our guns. The whole country had been disintegrated and was in anarchy; whilst the total cost of the war exceeded twenty millions sterling, being about the same amount as had been expended in the former great war of 1839-41." Again, our force displayed military skill and gallantry, "but, as regards the policy which led us into war, it appears to have been as unjust in principle as it was unfortunate in result."

Once more, in the recent military operations, we have a repetition of precisely the same folly. We have displayed military skill and personal gallantry in the highest degree, and yet we have been foiled through the egregious folly of our policy. History seems to have no meaning in the eyes of the "statesmen" responsible for such failures. Again the scarecrow of Russian aggression has fluttered our dovecots, and again we have been silly enough to rush upon disaster. General Adye points out, as we have done in these columns *ad nauseam*, that Russia, with all the will in the world, is totally unable to invade India. The advances Russia has made in Central Asia have done a great deal to civilise the people of the khanates she has seized; but these khanates—extending over a territory about as large as the whole of India—are so hopelessly barren and poor as to afford no sort of basis for an attack upon India, or even for a successful invasion of Afghanistan. "Troublesome as our neighbours have proved," says General Adye in reference to the tribesmen of the border, "still they have no power of inflicting serious injury, or of endangering our rule. Under these circumstances, the best policy, whilst firmly repressing their

predatory instincts, is to leave them alone." And why have they been troublesome? Just because they have not been left alone. It was the idiotic Russian bogey that took us to Chitral, as if any Russian invasion could possibly come over those mountains 25,000 feet high, with lakes 12,000 feet above the sea, and hardly a scrap of food to be had even in the summer valleys! "Although the Russians might, if unopposed, possibly move in small isolated detachments carrying their own food and munitions over the Pamirs, it would only be," as General Adye justly remarks, "to lose themselves in the gorges of the Himalayas." Why on earth, then, should we go and lose ourselves there? The present campaigns are directly traceable to the reversion of the Liberal policy after Chitral, and the direct menace of the Tory policy against the independence of the tribes. Thanks to the Tory Government, we have for the first time welded the frontier tribes into formidable combinations, which we have failed as yet to break up. "On the whole, then," concludes General Adye, "it appears to me that we should, as far as possible, withdraw our isolated posts, so many of which are either within the tribal country or along its borders." The argument of a demoralising effect was demolished in 1881 by Lord Hartington, when it was used to induce the Government to hold on to Kandahar. And again: "We are the rulers of a great Empire in the East, with its heavy duties and responsibilities, and in devoting ourselves to the welfare of the millions under our sway, and in developing the resources of the country, we shall do far more for the happiness of the people and the security of the Empire than by squandering our finances in constant expeditions beyond its borders." What is this but a summary of Lord Lawrence's remarkable statement of policy in his masterly despatch of January 4, 1869?

JOHN BRIGHT ON INDIA.

BRIGHT'S views on India are to be found chiefly in four speeches, one of which was delivered some four years before the Mutiny, while the others were delivered in the years immediately succeeding that event. In spite of the time that has elapsed, they still contain many passages apposite to the present situation. If, indeed, one compares them with the speeches of a great orator of the preceding century, one may for the moment experience some disappointment. Bright had not that extraordinary knowledge of India which enabled Burke to foresee so many of the consequences of British rule, nor had he that fierce enthusiasm for the cause which glows in Burke's words, giving life to the dry details of finance, and dignity to the petty quarrels of politicians. What one finds in Bright is not a minute knowledge of Indian questions, nor a special love for Indian institutions and character, but a generous zeal for human welfare and just government. As he looks round the world with calm and benignant eye, the course of affairs directs the great orator's gaze on India, with its poverty, its fiscal and racial oppressions, its Government spending the taxes that were crushing out its life in wars to extend the limits of alien domination; and forthwith he steps forward and, in that clear and simple English of which he was so great a master, appeals to those principles of liberty and justice which he would fain have wished to guide his country's policy throughout the earth.

With the particular usages of India, above all with that system of caste which is still vigorous there, he had little sympathy. But he was too far above the vulgar pride of race not to be shocked at the growing injustice of Englishmen to the Indian character, and not to feel that this was a fatal bar to our good government of that country. Thus he begins:—

> In the first place then, I say, let us abandon all that system of calumny against the natives of India which has lately prevailed. . . . Are they not industrious, are they not intelligent, are they not—upon the evidence of the most distinguished men the Indian Service ever produced—endowed with many qualities which make them respected by all Englishmen who mix with them?

And with this good opinion of the Indians it is no wonder that he should have expressed himself as "very anxious to see . . . a very much wider employment of the most intelligent and able men amongst the native population," and as believing that "there are thousands of persons in India who are competent to take any position to which the Government may choose to advance them." One case that he mentions arouses some sad reflections on the slowness of human progress and the strength of official obstinacy. There had recently come to England a young Indian to be educated for the Indian Civil Service. A change in the age of admission was fatal to his hopes, and Bright regretted this not only for the sake of the candidate, but because he believed that, if even *one* Indian were to pass, it would be impossible for the Government to avoid in the future holding examinations in India.

> If he had entered into that Civil Service a great thing would have been accomplished. The result would have been that the House and the Secretary for India would have seen that it was very unjust, while the son of any one here could pursue his studies at home and enter into competition for the Civil Service, that the sons of natives of India who wish to enter into the service of their own country, must come thousands of miles at great expense and live apart from their families for years, before they are able to accomplish their object, and the result must have been that you would have established in some city in India the same mode of examination that you have established here.

This was forty years ago. In the past forty years there have been many followers in the footsteps of that young Indian who have succeeded in their purpose. But the injustice still remains unredressed.

Bright cannot have failed to see also that in this way alone could the crushing expense of British Government in India be avoided. He was never tired of denouncing the terrible state of the Indian finances. Thus he speaks of "the impossibility of avoiding a great and dangerous financial crisis unless some alteration is made in the present system." Affirming the necessary connexion between good government and sound finance, he went on, "yet not in our own time, but going back through all the pages of Mill or of any other history of India, we find the normal condition of the finances of India has been that of deficit and bankruptcy." And yet by the side of this perpetual deficit, "the taxes of India are more onerous and oppressive than the taxes of any other country in the world." Bright saw the poor peasant with his "handful of rice per day," all else being swept into the Exchequer, and the work of England in India became ugly in his sight. He clearly saw that India was not that country of vast wealth which the first pioneers of English trade had thought it, and which under happier conditions it might yet become. But he, at all events, was not prepared to attribute India's poverty to some malign influence of nature or some innate wickedness of race. "I must say that it is my belief that if a country be found possessing a most fertile soil, and capable of bearing every variety of production, and that, notwithstanding, the people are in a state of extreme destitution and suffering, the chances are that there is some fundamental error in the government of that country."

But it was when he saw this weight of taxation which was already crushing the prosperity of the people, increased by the cost of unjust aggression, of wars undertaken to extend our enormous Empire, that he felt that the cup of our humiliation was full. To him a territory ten times the size of France, with a population four times as numerous as that of the United Kingdom, seemed enough to "satisfy the most gluttonous appetite for glory and supremacy." He saw that powerful classes among the rulers of India had their own reasons for looking favourably on war. He saw the madness of continually increasing our already vast responsibilities. Above all he saw the abyss of bankruptcy and ruin to which such a policy was hurrying India. And that this burden was to fall entirely on the innocent—on the people of India who had never done aught to provoke or foster a war beyond their frontier—this was indeed a shameful injustice. The English taxpayers had at least some voice in the matter. They could blame, if not their active support of an evil policy, at least their idle neglect of the affairs of India. "But there was no justice in imposing on the unfortunate millions of India the burden of a policy with which they had nothing to do, and which could not bring any one of them a single handful of rice more—it did bring them rather less than more—than they would have eaten without it." This was spoken concerning the payment for the early wars in Afghanistan, and after forty years we have again to face the same question. Are the people of India to do most of the fighting and all the paying in a war carried on beyond their frontiers, without reference to their wishes, and even in spite of their protests? In the Ministry that is responsible to the English people for that war there sits, as leader of the House of Commons, a repre-

sentative of the constituency of Manchester for which Bright sat when he made the speech from which we have just quoted, and another powerful member of the Government entered public life as Bright's colleague in the representation of Birmingham. But there is only too much reason to fear that the votes of those great cities will be cast by their representatives against all the principles for which he contended—will be cast in favour of burdening the already overburdened, and of making the wretched peasants of India responsible for an expenditure and a policy which they have been powerless to control. If that be really so, we shall be one step nearer to the catastrophe which Bright feared when he said:

I hope that no future historian will have to say that the arms of England in India were irresistible, and that an ancient empire fell before their victorious progress—yet that finally India was avenged, because the power of her conqueror was broken by the intolerable burdens and evils which she cast upon her victim, and that this wrong was accomplished by a waste of human life, and a waste of wealth which England, with all her power, was unable to bear.

THE BRITISH TREASURY AND INDIA: AN "IDOL OF THE DEN."

By An Anglo-Indian.

WHAT amongst recent Anglo-Indian affairs is the gravest incident or the most momentous subject in respect of which intimation has been given of official decision thereon? It is not the Press-stifling Bill; for there must be a sharp reaction regarding that blunder. It is not the ingenious pretence of abating "loss by exchange" by inventing a gold standard without gold currency; for that deceives no one, and will settle nothing. It is not even the sapient proposal—set out with much unction by those two light-weights the Hon. G. N. Curzon and Lord George Hamilton—to revise and settle the baneful trans-frontier policy by renewing it in more permanent form in re-establishing and extending fortified routes and garrisoned outposts in and beyond the mountain barriers of India. This feint would be merely childish except for its impenitent audacity. It is not (though this comes nearer) the recent optimistic guesses at the financial disclosures which must come next month—on which see the facts and figures set out on February 4 in this journal, pp. 69 and 70.

No; the portentous announcement to which our opening question refers is, that India will not, shall not, and must not receive any financial aid or contribution from the British Treasury—under any circumstances. This latter remark of ours is based on the conviction that there are no "conditions" conceivable—except an utter breakdown of British power in India, a possibility we can never admit—under which the Indian people could have stronger or more equitable claim for aid from the dominant partner than exists at present. For no one with the least real knowledge of the subject can give a moment's heed to the official plea that "these conditions" are modified by recent fatuous guesses as to possibility of "a large and substantial surplus" in March, 1899. Well, this inexorable stern decree that the stepdaughter of the Empire shall work or starve herself to the bone and go clad in rags all her days, was first distinctly promulgated in a brief passage of the Indian Secretary's speech at Chiswick on January 26th—since confirmed by significant remarks elsewhere. That ominous passage was quoted in full on p. 49; but these two clauses will suffice for our present purpose: "A strong feeling has been expressed on the part, I think, of every section of the community, to help India financially, if necessary, in the great troubles she has had to suffer;" and ". . . . it would be unwise to help India. It is much better to keep the two exchequers as far apart as we can"—that is, Dives with his millions shall not concern himself with the penniless Lazarus. These two remarks serve to indicate the sub-divisions of this important subject—(*a*) the present question of urgent need and claim to generosity; (*b*) that of permanent obligation and political equity.

As to the former, Lord George said truly that the claim had been recognised by "every section of the community," as also by men of every party, himself included, almost up to the very day of his own obdurate fiat. It might still be useful if some man of leisure would collect from the newspapers the several expressions of generous desire that the Indian people should have their intolerable burdens lightened, at least temporarily, from our overflowing Imperial funds. But as typical of all these earnest and liberal proposals, it may suffice here to cite those in the Budget debate of August last by Mr. Samuel Smith on one side, and Sir Andrew Scoble on the other. At the close of the speech by the member for Flintshire, which, by the way, was a telling exposition of the destitution prevailing amongst the masses of the Indian people, he "appealed to the Government and the House to make a special grant to India in this time of awful need. Our income is overflowing; we shall have another large surplus next year. . . . . He thought that £2,000,000 could be applied so as to confer immense benefits upon India, and that it would touch the hearts of the people of that country as nothing else had done." To this response was, later on, made from the other side of the House by Sir Andrew Scoble, who though not of the official class has held high position as a member of the Supreme Executive Council at Simla. In course of several pertinent remarks on the painful situation, he said: "I believe that a grant from this Parliament would have the effect that the member for Flintshire anticipated, and would produce an outburst of gratitude from the cultivators of the land (not them only, but every class and race) which would do much to strengthen British rule in India." Following him, Sir Henry Fowler, rising above himself for a moment, urged the granting of "an Imperial contribution to the revenues of India out of Imperial funds." He supported this very suitably by quoting from the Mahárájá of Darbunga's speech in the Supreme Legislative Council, in which, after referring to the charges borne by India for Imperial purposes, that Hindu nobleman said: "In time of his (the Indian taxpayer's) need, he may, therefore, fairly appeal to the home Government for a subsidy: and I am sure he would not appeal in vain to the generous English nation, for his demand is based on considerations of justice and equity."

Thus there is no further need of witnesses to show that under our sub-division (*a*) there was—we would fain say is—an unprecedented consensus of our public men on behalf of a generous grant of Imperial funds in aid of the impoverished people of India and of its exhausted finances. Are we to believe that all these generous professions of practical sympathy, which are also considerations of the highest expediency, can be swept away by the brief, cold fiat emitted at Chiswick? This is so, as we stand now; and the question now is where and what can be the ogre of blind political selfishness which has blotted out that impulse of humanity by the inane dictum, "It would be unwise to help India"?

Some new philosopher, yet to be evolved, may explain how it is that, while the British people are the most generous in the world, when it comes to some vital question of political justice and financial equity, our official classes are amongst the most "stolid and obstinate" on the face of the earth. But so it is in this typical instance, which is one that pertains to the very soul of the Empire's existence. The ogre we have to deal with in this case is not an organic creature that can be got at and slain in its lair. It is an implacable tradition, embedded in every fibre of our Treasury Department, to wit, that "India must not and shall not, on any condition whatever, be brought into our finance accounts." It was this "idol of the den" to which the Indian Secretary found himself constrained feebly to allude in the phrase, "it is much better to keep the two exchequers as far apart as we can." This decree, more implacable and abiding than any of the Medes and Persians, has seldom been formulated, because, no doubt, of its votaries' instinctive consciousness that it cannot bear the light of day. Nevertheless, certain tentative and suggestive apologies for it were put forward during December, and, of all places, in the *Economist*. It had been obvious to those who are accustomed to search below the surface, at the time of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's cautious though promising hint at Bristol—"if, in our judgment, the financial condition of India requires it, I shall not hesitate to ask the British Parliament to come to the aid of India"—that warnings had been emitted from "the den" of the inexorable precept of that absolute though unwritten decree. And at the time that Lord George came to make the disclosure at Chiswick the iron of thatf pitiless tradition of the Treasury had entered into the souls of many friends of India, who may yet survive in his heterogeneous and flaccid Council.

It is difficult to deal with the illusive apologies insinuated rather than stated in the *Economist* article, because the writer, whose direct knowledge of Indian finance evidently dates from and pertains only to the early sixties, mixes up his argument with erratic remarks, some of them just, on "the financiers produced by the bureaucracy," and with superfluous variations on the half-truth that "the House of Commons is wholly incompetent to govern India in detail." The main argument in the article is, that if the Indian finances "are relieved of painful pressure by English grants," they will cease to "resist all aggression beyond the frontier and all unnecessary waste in preparing for an invasion that may never come;" that they will allow Parliament to "interfere disastrously" with the system of Indian taxation; that they will no longer feel "coerced by an absolute necessity for economy"; that they will "allow the cost of the military department to rise and rise as if the army obeyed a law of its own." But all these absurdly inappropriate pleas indicate an utter misconception of the actual course of Indian financial policy during the last two-and-twenty years, a period which, save for one temporary interval, is sharply marked off by the resignation of Lord Northbrook in 1875. The readers of INDIA, at any rate, are too well aware that this disastrous and profligate course, so curiously imagined by the *Economist* writer as likely to follow from the British Treasury having to sustain some definite portion of Indian expenditure, exactly describes the *present*

situation, which is directly attributable to the statutory control of Parliament having been effectually evaded and "coerced" by "the financiers of the bureaucracy," alike at Whitehall and at Simla. It is impracticable, and indeed needless here to adduce demonstration of this revolutionary inversion of the relative functions of the High Court of Parliament, and those of the irresponsible salaried servants of the State; but the time has come, if the right men can be found, to restore the true relations of those functions and thereby arrest the hemorrhage that is bleeding India to death.

It is not easy within the compass of a brief article to more than indicate how the sovereign remedy would work of the British treasury being compelled to sustain its fair share of the cost of maintaining our sway over India, that sway which provides so large a proportion of the power, prestige, and profit of the United Kingdom. All the class interests, the craving for patronage, pay, and promotion, of which our great spending departments are the centre, and of which the Treasury, where India is concerned, is the jealous guardian, oppose to the death this important reformation. The present inexpressibly blind and selfish decision proves this emphatically. As to the principles of political equity that demand this righteous restoration of imperial responsibility, these have been demonstrated, line upon line, during the last thirty years by those few writers, Indian statesmen included, who understand the bases of the problem of India.

THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT.

BY OUR OWN ONLOOKER.

THERE is something pathetic about the ever-recurring interest in the opening of a Session of Parliament. There is also a striking similarity in the functions. The same crowds assemble opposite Palace Yard to gaze at the worthy members going in. The same policemen are in the same positions, the inside of the building is perhaps a little cleaner than just before a recess, but that is all the difference. The members hurry about shaking hands with each other, smiling, full of animated expectancy. Hope is high in the legislative bosom. Prospects are as bright as the new hats; and as I watch the scene in the Lobby I find it impossible to avoid reflecting that some of those hats and some of the members are alike destined to be sat upon and crushed before long. The radiant looks (both in man and hat) do not last, and before but a few hours are over there is visible in many a face that appearance of yawning boredom so characteristic of Westminster. I heard a member asking for "a pair" before six o'clock on Tuesday! It was one of those strange men who had come down before daylight—so soon had he fallen away from his first love.

I am by no means an enemy to picturesque old ceremonies when they do no harm. I cannot help thinking, however, that much that goes on when a Session is opened could be dispensed with advantageously. There is no great harm in the procession to the Lords and the return. But why read all those solemn Sessional orders? Some of them are openly recognised as farces. And why should time be taken up by members giving notice of the wonderful things they propose to do "at an early date"? All this could be printed. And above all why have the Address moved and seconded by uniformed members or by any members? The impression left on my mind by all this is that while leaders of parties have sent out circulars to their followers declaring that matters of the utmost importance will be at once submitted to Parliament, there seems to be a general desire to postpone the matters of importance so as to talk about generalities.

When the real debate on the Queen's Speech began at last, it was soon made evident that the real interest of the occasion centred in foreign affairs—if, for the moment, one may regard Indian topics as coming under this heading, though India is not governed from the Foreign Office. It has an office to itself, for which it has to pay heavily. It has also a "statesman" to itself, Lord George Hamilton, and he, too, is an expensive luxury. The debate on Tuesday cannot be said to have reached a high level, though Sir William Harcourt's speech will no doubt read well. His contemptuous dismissal of the proposed domestic legislation of the Government as that "parliamentary collection of uninsurable lives" was singularly apt. But it was evident to everyone that his followers were more keen on criticism of the recent war beyond the North-West Indian frontier than on anything else. His declaration that the time had come when the House and the public should have a chance of expressing an opinion on the "forward policy" of the Government was much cheered. He also roasted Lord George Hamilton deliciously over the making of the road to Chitral. Nor could anyone question the soundness of Sir William's advice to poor Lord George—that he should either be more silent or be better informed. I noticed that the Indian Secretary was very uneasy, and he might well be. He was tempted into more than one interruption—and must have been sorry he spoke each time.

Next to India, I should say China attracted most attention. The Queen's Speech actually contained no reference whatever to China, but Mr. Balfour made up by some very candid remarks. China wanted a loan. Indeed, that is a way China has. We were prepared to lend on certain conditions, and that is also a way with lenders. We wanted to have Talienwan made a free port. China demurred, and we therefore agreed not to insist, and Mr. Balfour's summing-up of the situation was that China had ceased to ask for the loan. It seems to be "hoff," as they say in cheap restaurants. One important point was stated in this connexion—Germany and Russia have agreed that the free ports shall be kept open to the trade of the world, and that is good. But Sir William Harcourt did well to ask, What then was the Chancellor of the Exchequer so ready to fight about?

I suppose any impartial man in the House—and we may for the sake of argument presume the existence of one—would acknowledge that Sir Charles Dilke is the best-informed man in the House on foreign affairs. His attack on Lord Salisbury's foreign policy was most damaging. The gist of it was this: Here you are in China, and you say your policy is all for equal opportunities for trade and free ports. Good; but how can we tell that you mean business? Lord Salisbury was all for this sort of thing in Siam, in Tunis, and in Madagascar. In each case he has "knuckled under" abjectly; scuttled away ignominiously. And in each case the surrender has been unconditional. We have had no *quid pro quo*. Our trade has been sacrificed to France for nothing at all. How then can we trust Lord Salisbury to look after our interests in China? It was a telling argument, and was backed up by a wealth of knowledge. Each statement was proved by reference to dates and documents in a deadly manner. No man of feeling can bring himself to describe poor Mr. Curzon's reply. The kindest course towards that young gentleman is to "hush up" his performance. And so the first day ended, having shown that foreign and Indian affairs will dominate a great part of the Session, and that the Government has but a sorry case.

Wednesday, February 9.

The first amendment to the Address was one dealing with distress in Ireland. I do not propose to go into the details of the matter, but rather to describe how the discussion impressed me—an English sympathiser with Ireland. First of all there is something positively heartbreaking in this everlasting grievance. The Tories (or most of them) simply grow impatient and say the Irish are always grumbling. They overlook the fact that we are always giving the Irish reasons for discontent. The Liberals are regarded by some as having lost all interest in Ireland, but that is, I think, an unfair and incorrect view. What they say is, "what is the use of this continual tinkering with distress in Ireland? Your doles and your cheap potato-seed and all the rest of it are no good. What is wanted is an absolute and complete reform in our methods of governing Ireland."

There are those who are very much shocked at the declarations by some of the Irish of sympathy with the Afridis and with Russia in China. Well, of course, disloyalty is always deplorable. But it seems to me that loyalty is in these days more or less a commercial affair. It is a feeling of gratitude for favours or at least benefits received. But the Irish have but little cause for gratitude, and how does Michael Davitt, for instance, owe us much loyalty? It is a miserable fact, but one that must be faced, that a hundred years of statesmanship have merely resulted in the Irish hating us more bitterly than ever. That was the outcome of Wednesday's debate so far as I was concerned. The Government certainly promised some more of those pottering doles, but they refuse to tackle the real problem.

CHRONICLE OF THE WEEK.

THURSDAY, February 3.—Three of the bye-elections were decided. Sir Samuel Scott, Conservative, was returned without opposition for West Marylebone. The polling took place in South-East Durham, and the votes were to be counted on the following day. In South Wolverhampton the votes were immediately counted, with the result that Mr. John Lloyd Gibbons, Liberal Unionist, was elected by a majority of one hundred and eleven votes over his Liberal opponent, Mr. G. R. Thorne, to fill the seat rendered vacant by the death of Mr. Villiers, Liberal Unionist.

It was evident that the feud between the two wings of the Unionist party in Edgbaston had not been closed by the vote taken at the meeting on Wednesday evening, at which Mr. Chamberlain was present. A meeting of the Joint (Liberal Unionist and Conservative) Committee was held to-day, but as the Conservative Executive had not complied with the condition that a choice of candidates should be secured by the submission of two names, the meeting was adjourned until to-morrow. Mr. F. W. Lowe, president of the Birmingham Conservative Association, was alone put forward.

A meeting called by the "Liberal Forwards" was held in Queen's Hall. Mr. G. W. E. Russell was in the chair. Resolutions were passed denouncing the policy of the Government

in Eastern Europe, in India, and in South Africa; supporting social reforms in which labour was vitally interested; and appealing to all Liberals to support the Progressives at the County Council election.

A Privy Council was held at Osborne for the approval of the Queen's Speech, and for other business incidental to the opening of the Parliamentary Session on Tuesday next.

FRIDAY, February 4.—A remarkable Liberal victory was achieved in South-East Durham in the contest for the seat rendered vacant by the death of Sir H. Havelock-Allan. The votes were counted this morning, the official declaration showing that 6,286 votes were cast for Alderman Richardson, the Liberal, and 6,011 for the Hon. F. W. Lambton, the Unionist. The Liberal minority of 114 at the last election was thus converted into a majority of 275. This was a gain of a seat to the Liberals.

In connexion with the schism in the "Unionist" ranks in Edgbaston, Mr. E. H. Lee, the honorary secretary of the Liberal Unionist Association in the division, announced his intention of resigning.

Domadar Chapekar was found guilty of the murder of Lieutenant Ayerst and Mr. Rand on Jubilee Day at Poona, and was sentenced to death.

Mr. Gerald Balfour, in the course of his annual address to his constituents in Central Leeds, said the Government were in no way flinching from the position they had taken up on the Chinese question, and their policy remained firm in accordance with the declarations members of the Cabinet had made on the subject. The time had not arrived for any statement to be made as to the negotiations for the proposed loan. The Irish Local Government Bill, which would be introduced early in the coming Session, would be as democratic as the system already established in England and Scotland.

Sir Robert Reid, Q.C., M.P., was the guest of the political committee of the Manchester Reform Club. Sir Robert advised a concentration of the energies of the Liberal party. Before the party could do anything effective there must be a reform in the power of the House of Lords. The only way to achieve that reform, as it seemed to him, was to follow on the lines of the Liberal statesmen of 1832, who staked their political existence on the passing of the Reform Bill and refused to take office unless they were assured after a General Election of the necessary support to force the House of Lords to obey the declared will of the people.

SATURDAY, February 5.—Lord Salisbury presided over a meeting of the Cabinet held at the Foreign Office. All the Ministers were present with the exception of Earl Cadogan.

Two sittings of the Joint Committee were held at Edgbaston with the object of arranging for the nomination of a candidate acceptable to the two wings of the "Unionist" party, but their deliberations were ineffective, and the deadlock continues. During the afternoon and evening there were private conferences of the local leaders.

SUNDAY, February 6.—Mr. Gladstone's condition, according to the latest bulletin, showed continued improvement. The right hon. gentleman attended church to-day.

MONDAY, February 7.—The special correspondent of the *Standard*, at Constantinople, learned that England, France, and Russia would guarantee the Greek Indemnity Loan in order to facilitate the evacuation of Thessaly, which was said to depend on its payment.

In view of the opening of Parliament the usual dinners were given by the Leaders to their chief supporters in both Houses. Lord Salisbury entertained the Conservative Peers, the Duke of Devonshire the Liberal Unionists, and the Earl of Kimberley a party of Liberal Peers. Mr. Balfour gave a dinner to his colleagues in the House of Commons, and Sir W. Harcourt entertained the occupants of the Front Opposition Bench.

Two Blue-books were issued with Despatches relative to affairs beyond the Indian frontier.

The trial of M. Zola at the Seine Assize Court for libellous charges against French officers and others in connexion with the Dreyfus case was opened, many witnesses regarded as essential for the defence sent letters excusing themselves for non-attendance. M. Zola was followed by a hooting crowd on leaving the court.

TUESDAY, February 8.—The fourth Session of the present Parliament was opened by Royal Commission. The debate on the Address was begun in both Houses.

The same general features as on the first day of M. Zola's trial characterised the proceedings to-day. Madame Dreyfus was called, but the judge interfered before the first question could be answered. Thereupon the defendant's counsel, M. Labori, put in writing the questions he desired to ask; and the judge said nothing would be allowed which bore in any way upon the trial and conviction of Captain Dreyfus. M. Casimir-Perier, an ex-President, gained the hearty approbation of all by saying he attended as a simple citizen of France. The judge would not permit him to answer any questions.

Owing to Russian objections to the British conditions for granting a loan, the Chinese Government was said to have invited subscriptions for an internal loan of a hundred million taels, to meet the instalment of the Japanese indemnity due in May. At Pekin it was not expected that the money would be forthcoming, and the issue of the Decree was regarded as merely intended to "give China a face."

WEDNESDAY, February 9.—In the debate on the Address, Mr. Davitt moved an amendment in the House of Commons dealing with the subject of distress in Ireland. He urged the necessity first of applying measures of temporary relief on a large and generous scale to the suffering districts; and secondly of introducing legislation calculated to avert the constant recurrence of famine in the affected areas.

Russia made a "temporary withdrawal" of the candidature of Prince George as Governor of Crete. If any candidate could be found who would satisfy the Sultan, the Powers, and the Cretans, the Russian Government it was said would assent to the choice.

The trial of M. Zola was continued in Paris. The chief witnesses examined were General de Boisdeffre, Chief of the General Staff, General Gonse, M. Trarieux, and General Mercier, who was Minister of War during the trial of Dreyfus. The last-mentioned officer, in reply to the question whether Dreyfus had been found guilty on evidence not communicated to him or to his counsel, refused to reply.

Imperial Parliament.

Tuesday, February 8.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH AND INDIA.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR delivered her Majesty's gracious Speech to both Houses of Parliament. The Speech made the following references to India:—

On the North-Western borders of my Indian Empire, an organised outbreak of fanaticism, which spread in the summer along the frontier, induced many of the tribes to break their engagements with my Government, to attack military posts in their vicinity, and even to invade a settled district of my territory. I was compelled to send expeditions against the offending tribes for the punishment of these outrages, and to insure peace in the future. A portion of the Afridi tribes have not yet accepted the terms offered to them, but elsewhere the operations have been brought to a successful close.

The courage and endurance exhibited by my troops, British and Native, have overcome the almost insuperable difficulties of the country in which they were operating; but I have to deplore the loss of many valuable lives, both amongst my own troops and those whose services were voluntarily and loyally placed at my disposal by the Native Princes of my Indian Empire.

Papers on this subject will be laid before you.

The plague, which appeared more than a year ago in Western India, returned in the autumn; and, although the mortality is less alarming than it was at this time last year, it is still such as to cause anxiety. No effort will be spared by my Government in the endeavour both to limit its extent and to mitigate its effects; and I am confident that they will receive the loyal assistance of my Indian subjects in this arduous task. I rejoice, on the other hand, to inform you that the famine, which prevailed for many months over several large districts, may now be said to be at an end excepting within a small tract in Madras; and that there is reason to anticipate a prosperous year, both for agriculture and commerce, throughout my Indian dominions.

THE DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS.

THE WAR BEYOND THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

The EARL OF HARDWICKE, moving the Address in reply, said in the course of his speech:—Turning to the subject of India, surely nature and man had combined together to trouble the peace of that country during the past year. Earthquakes and convulsions of nature were a fitting accompaniment to plague, famine and war. They welcomed the assurance that the famine was well-nigh over, but they regretted that her Majesty was not able to use the same reassuring language in regard to the plague, though they could derive some small satisfaction from the knowledge that it was not of so destructive a type as before. In regard to the question of the Indian Frontier war, all were agreed that the outbreak having taken place it had to be put down. Forts which had been lost had to be recovered, and England's prestige had to be vindicated. (Cheers.) The policy of the Government in India had been the subject of considerable criticism. But he submitted that that policy had been demonstrably in accordance with the policy pursued, and continuously pursued, by successive Administrations during the past 20 years. (Cheers.) A departure from that policy was not to be found in any action of her Majesty's Government; but it was to be found in the intention of the late Government to evacuate Chitral. (Cheers.)

The Earl of KIMBERLEY, in the course of his speech, said:—I come now to the great question in India. There you have a very large British and Native army—a larger force than has ever assembled before under a British general—engaged in a most dangerous and protracted conflict with warlike tribes on the frontier. We have noted with the utmost satisfaction the gallantry of our officers and men in mountain warfare of the most difficult description; but here is a question which tasks to a very considerable extent our military power, and that is a reason why it is to my mind a misfortune that at one and the same time we find ourselves engaged in warlike operations in that territory as well as in the Sudan. . . . Now as to India. We have never varied from our opinion that it is a fatal mistake to per-

manently occupy Chitral, with a road leading through the territory of independent tribes. Every one knows that the late Government had decided they would not maintain that road. We did so on considerations which appeared to us to be powerful and as affecting the whole policy of the maintenance of authority on the frontier of India. We were, no doubt, actuated also by the terms of the proclamation which has been referred to; and whatever interpretation may be placed upon it by speakers and writers in this country I think that the unqualified terms in which that proclamation was issued would lead the tribes to no other conclusion than that we were withdrawing from that territory. But I lay more stress on the general effect of our frontier policy in not maintaining that road. Chitral itself comes within our frontier because it is, in point of fact, a dependency of Kashmir; but not so the territory which lies between Peshawar and Chitral, and through which the road has been made. It is the maintenance of a permanent garrison at Chitral which requires that road, and which, in our opinion, has been proved by events to be a great mistake. I am perfectly aware, and I entirely admit, that it is desirable to have a post of observation at Chitral, but, if that post of observation can only be maintained by establishing a road through the territory of these tribes, then, in my opinion, the inconvenience of not having a permanent officer stationed at Chitral was far less than the dangers which would be incurred by making the road and in maintaining a permanent garrison. Neither did it appear to me there was any absolute necessity for it, because we have already positions at points nearer Chitral, and it is perfectly possible to maintain an officer there whose communications would enable us to have full knowledge of what was passing in that region. That full knowledge was all that it was essential for us to have. I, therefore, came to the conclusion that it was not desirable permanently to occupy Chitral, and, in point of fact, during the time I was in office, I contemplated the position as one which was merely temporary. I cannot for a moment doubt that the maintenance of that road has had a most serious effect in causing this terrible rising near Peshawar. That has been denied, but I find striking proof of the truth of what I have said in the papers which have just been published, but which I have scarcely had time to look at. There is the translation of a letter, without date, "from the Mullah of Adda to all the Mullahs and elders of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes." He says:—"The Kafirs have taken possession of all Mussulman countries, and owing to the lack of spirit on the part of the people are conquering every region. They have now reached those countries of Bajaur and Swat, but, though the people of those places showed want of courage in the beginning, they have now realised their mistake, and having repented and become ashamed (of their former deeds) they attack them (the Kafirs) day and night, and have quite confounded them." Can anyone doubt who reads that extract that this was one of the chief causes by which the Mullahs persuaded the tribes to rise? That that was not the only cause I fully and freely admit, but that it was one of the most real and important causes I have not the remotest doubt. The tribes naturally cherish their independence, and seeing these fortified posts established on their territory in Malakand, came to the conclusion that it was part of the policy to gradually extend our administration and power over the whole of the tribes. You tell us in the gracious Speech that the fanaticism of the tribes produced this rising, but I maintain that that is no defence whatever for what has occurred. Why, the fanaticism of the tribes is the fanaticism of all Mahometan nations who are about to attack a Christian Power; but it was not fanaticism which was the primary cause. The primary cause was the interference with their independence, and the fanaticism was the means by which they excited the tribes against us. That being the case, we hold, as I said before, that the decision of Her Majesty's Government to reverse the decision of the late Government had a vital effect in producing this rising. That there have been other causes I fully admit. For example, I do not doubt that the Durand agreement had its effect. That was not an agreement for extending our frontier as some people suppose, nor did it necessitate our moving forward into the Afridi country or into the Swat country. The Durand agreement had primarily this object—namely, to mark the line between us and the Amir, because there were so many difficult subjects arising amongst the tribes which caused ill-feeling between us and the Amír that it was found desirable, in the interests of both, to lay down a line beyond which the Amír on his side and we on ours should not interfere. It was a negative agreement as to what we were not to do, but it did not bind us to a forward policy. The tribes may have regarded the agreement as handing them over to us, and they may have concluded that the consequence would be an interference with their independence. But, surely, that being so, was that the moment to take any step whatever which might increase the suspicion of the tribes and confirm them in the opinion that the Durand agreement was intended to interfere with their independence. (Hear, hear.) On the contrary, the Government of India ought to have acted with the greatest possible caution, and to have led the tribes clearly to understand that the Durand agreement did not affect their independence, and then probably any measures taken would have been very different from those which have been adopted on this occasion. Possibly, also, the knowledge, or, rather, the rumours, of the successes of the Sultan of Turkey were used among other arguments to excite the tribes, but I do not believe for a moment that that of itself had any serious effect. As regards the most important and difficult question of the frontier and the policy to be pursued, in the first place I have not had time to study carefully the papers which have just been laid on the Table, but on the general subject I wish to say a word or two. I wish to say nothing disparaging to the admirable soldiers in command of our Indian army, but it is natural for them, I think, to take a strongly military view, and there has existed for a long time a very strong pressure on the Government of India to push what is known as the "forward" policy. The Lawrence policy was very important, no doubt, at the time; but we must look at matters as they stand now, and what we believe to be most important for the peace and security of India is to deprecate that you should take as your policy the occupation of all the passes between us and Afghanistan, and the maintenance in those passes of military posts to control them. I would ask any man whether—even if you occupy these roads, and the time came when you had to send—and long may it be before we have to send—a great expedition to Afghan territory to meet a powerful enemy coming from the north—I would ask any man whether the mere existence of military posts in these passes would not be far more than counterbalanced by the hostility of the tribes? I cannot conceive a more perilous condition of things than that you should have to confront a rising of tribes on such an occasion. I believe the task of maintaining communications with India over a long space in the midst of hostile tribes would be a task beyond any military power which this country possesses, and the danger you might incur might be of the most serious kind. It is by no means to be laid down that there is no line of communication which we must maintain. We have already the line of communication to Quetta and the railway beyond, and I suppose there are few persons who would go so far as to say that we could safely leave the Khyber Pass closed, but that is a very different thing from embarking on a policy which, I regret to say, a general for whom I have great respect, Sir George White, has advocated—namely, the subjugation of those warlike tribes and the establishment of our authority throughout that part of India. That seems to me to be a policy which on every possible consideration ought to be most strenuously and carefully avoided; and I should be surprised if I did not find that on the general question, setting aside details, her Majesty's Government take the same view that I have ventured to place before your lordships. I would earnestly hope that every one in this country will support those of the Indian Government who desire that we shall not engage in any military forward movements without any ultimate design of establishing throughout that region British control.

The Marquis of Salisbury, in the course of his speech, said:—I have only now to say a word about the Indian frontier. I think I heard the noble lord twice apologise for not going further by saying that he had not read the papers, which, as they were only circulated this afternoon, is not at all astonishing; but I wonder it did not suggest itself to him that it would have been better to have deferred his comments until he had seen the evidence upon which they were based. The noble lord stakes his whole case upon this:—You may talk of Mahometan fanaticism, you may talk about the action of the Government of India when, with the approval of Sir Henry Fowler, they advanced to Chitral, but all these things go for nothing, and the one thing that is of importance is the Chitral road. But these are matters of inference on which the evidence must be consulted, and until you examine the Blue-book you really are not in a position to decide whether the Chitral road was essential. We are told by those acquainted with the government of India that the people who are near the Chitral road are very well content, and that the rebellion has been less formidable in the parts affected by that road than further south, where the Chitral road had nothing to do with it. I believe that fanaticism has had a great deal to do with it, but I confess I think there has been a great deal more. If you look into this country, wherever you see a barbarous mountain population by the side of a civilised population dwelling in the plains, those people have never been able to live long in peace with each other, and it has been the rule that ultimately the mountain population must accept the civilisation of its neighbour. You will not be able, do what you will, to avoid that law. You may cast the blame on this act or on that; you may say it is the fault of one statesman or another; but the mere incidents which are the inciting cause of each successive struggle are to be traced not really to a road or to a boundary, or even to the spread of a wave of fanaticism; they are to be traced to the jealousy and terror which a mountain population feel at the neighbourhood of a civilised population which they know to be more advanced and more formidable than themselves, yet whose superiority they despise. I trust that we shall be able to perform what is an inevitable conquest by the gentle means of example and gradual intercourse. To a military "forward policy" I am myself as much opposed as the noble earl, but I believe a forward policy is inevitable—that is to say, we must gradually convert to our way of thinking in matters of civilisation these splendid tribes. I hope the process may not be dangerously interfered with by this frontier war. I lament it very seriously and the passions which it arouses, and I do not underrate the difficulty which all over the world we are feeling with the Mahometan population wherever we come across them. There is an impulse stirring in them, and a slight victory, or an exaggerated victory, recalls to them their past of a thousand years ago when they were victors in every conflict, and they cannot but believe that their past history is to be repeated. I am not surprised that that feeling should exist. I should deeply grieve if any unnecessary occupation, or any unnecessary violence were to irritate or stimulate that feeling instead of our exercising a demulcent influence by the gradual extension of our civilisation and our rule, by which in time their hostility may be appeased. I can assure the noble lord that there is no wish on the part of her Majesty's Government and the Indian Government to occupy a single position which is not in the judgment of a sufficient consensus of expert men, an absolute necessity. The noble lord admits that we must keep our way open through the mountains; he admits that the Khyber cannot be neglected. We, on the other hand, are convinced that every additional post is an additional danger, an additional evil, and tends to put off the day which we so greatly desire—namely, that which shall see the reconciliation of these tribes and the rest of our Indian subjects. (Cheers.) I think that in that policy we shall be heartily supported by the people of this country. In this case as in the case of China, we have no desire for an increase of territory which would only be an increase of burden, but we desire to diminish every possible danger.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

PAPERS PRESENTED.

East India (Loans raised in England),—Copy presented—of **Return of all Loans raised in England, chargeable on the Revenues of India,**

outstanding at the commencement of the half-year ending September 30, 1897, etc. [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

East India (Loans raised in India),—Copy presented—of Return of all Loans raised in India, chargeable on the revenues of India, outstanding at the commencement of the half-year ending on September 30, 1897, etc. [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

East India Council (Re-appointment of Sir James Braithwaite Peile),—Copy presented—of Minute by the Secretary of State for India extending the term of Sir James Braithwaite Peile's office as Member of the Council of India [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

East India Council (Re-appointment of Sir Alfred Comyns Lyall),—Copy presented—of Minute by the Secretary of State for India extending the term of Sir Alfred Comyns Lyall's office as Member of the Council of India [by Act]; to lie upon the Table.

DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS.

THE WAR BEYOND THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

Colonel Lockwood, moving the address in reply, said in the course of his speech, India had been suffering a triple blow—pestilence, famine, and the sword—causing lamentable loss of life and a severe strain on her financial resources. With reference to the plague, which had unfortunately again broken out, it was a pleasing fact that the natives, instead of resisting, as they formerly did, our efforts to put a stop to the disease, were now assisting us. The tact and devotion shown by the doctors and troops while engaged in that difficult task were beyond all praise. In their combat with the famine the Government had been ably assisted by the heroic efforts of their Civil Service, by their marvellous organisation, and by those contributions from this country which, in his opinion, reflected as much credit on the nation as on the individual subscribers. Referring to the frontier war, he said the loss of life had been great, and even in that House they had to lament the death of a gallant baronet whose strong personality and inheritance of a name great in Indian annals always made him a remarkable figure on those benches. (Hear, hear.) Many officers had fallen, because British officers had a knack, which he hoped would never desert them, of leading instead of following their men. (Hear, hear.) What more magnificent example of British pluck and bravery could be given than that of General Yeatman-Biggs, who, while suffering from an exhausting illness, continued to lead his troops, or of Colonel Haughton dying at the head of his Sikhs? The zeal and devotion of the Native troops could not be over-estimated. It was a striking testimony of the success of our rule in India. (Hear, hear.) It was to be hoped that at no distant time we might arrive at a peaceful settlement with the tribes with whom we had been fighting, and with whose tribal customs and laws we had no wish to interfere. (Hear, hear.)

Sir W. Harcourt, in the course of his speech, said: Turning to the Address and to the topics which are suggested by the Speech from the Throne, and I must say many other topics which are not alluded to in that Speech, I am sure the Government cannot, and will not, complain that the House and the country look for and demand from them explanations upon many questions, more questions than I ever recollect at the commencement of a Session of Parliament. I am sure that the leader of the House will not take any objection to a demand of that character, for I observe that when he addressed his constituents some weeks ago, in what I may characterise as a very able speech, he remarked upon the circumstance that in three successive years he had come before them, and that in each year there was a new panorama of international difficulties with which he had to deal. He said the centre of interest moved first from America, then to Africa, then to the Near East, then to India, then to the Far East. Centres of interest no doubt, but it sounds rather like a description of one of those circular storms in which the blast comes from every quarter of the globe in turn. But whatever else they may be, these centres of interest cannot be described as halcyon days, considering that at this moment we have in different parts of the world not far off 100,000 men under arms. I believe there are 70,000 men in India and some thousands of men in Egypt, and more are to be added to them. We can hardly congratulate ourselves upon what has been called the *Pax Britannica*. (A laugh.) . . . . Your Indian frontier policy is a great question, that cannot be disposed of to-night. This policy has arisen from a course of conduct known by the familiar term "forward policy," and after what has happened in the last six months the time has come when the House of Commons and the English people must pronounce for or against the spirit of this forward policy. (Cheers.) That is a question upon which certainly we shall desire to give the House an opportunity of forming and expressing an opinion; but to-night I shall confine myself to a single point and a striking illustration of this forward policy—the occupation of Chitral. We sometimes hear of a continuation of policy, but we shall not be told this was a continuous policy, for, indeed, it is a remarkable example of an Administration coming into office and hurrying, without time for examination, to reverse the policy of their predecessors. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord used to pride himself on having reversed that policy, and he asked the Conservative party to rejoice with him upon this reversal. (Lord G. Hamilton interjected a remark.) The noble lord will have an opportunity. I have so many subjects upon which I wish to put our point of view. The Blue-book just issued of course requires consideration, and the House will desire to have the means of considering it; but there are facts sufficiently well known. When a force was sent to rescue the Resident at Chitral a proclamation was issued to the tribes declaring we had no intention to occupy any territory among the independent tribes. It was seen to be impossible from the first, because it was quite plain that, if permanent occupation was intended the road must be permanently occupied, whether the tribes were willing or not. That was the view of the Secretary for India, for he referred to the fatuity of allowing the road to be closed again. After the relief of Chitral and the proclamation, the question was whether Chitral should be permanently occupied or evacuated. This question was determined on the question of the road. It was said the old road was impractical for all useful purposes, and therefore, if Chitral were to be occupied, it could only be by a road of 150 miles through the territory of independent tribes. Now, the great materiality of the road is a thing perfectly well known, and upon the subject I would commend the book called "Our Asiatic Neighbours," by Mr. Thorburn. Speaking of Kohat, the author showed how we had refrained from making roads for wheeled traffic to avoid hurting the feelings of the tribes. Offers of increased subsidies failed to tempt the Afridis to agree to the construction of the road, because the road would be to them a visible sign of their lost independence. This was written the year before this question arose, and Mr. Thorburn goes on to say that the reason why we have never made a road through the pass is that the Government in dealing with Indian feudatories and border tribes is always scrupulously faithful to its promises and engagements, and the knowledge of this has gained England the great name she has throughout Central Asia. That is Mr. Thorburn's view in reference to roads through the territory of independent tribes. My right hon. friend (Sir H. Fowler) has given the reason for not occupying Chitral, the great danger on a road of 150 miles from the fanaticism of tribesmen hostile to foreigners; the great cost of maintenance; and the arrangements with the tribes might be broken at a critical moment, and the work of opening up by a military force would have to be done over again. The late Government decided that no military force or European agent should be kept at Chitral, and that no road should be made from Peshawar to Chitral. At a late hour—at the eleventh hour—the noble lord comes to see the materiality of the road, and, having seen that, he is anxious to declare that it was not he, but we, who made the road. (Hear, hear.) But at the time he made this extraordinary discovery it appears that he was not altogether informed, and the correspondence shows he was not informed.

Lord G. Hamilton: May I explain?

Sir W. Harcourt:—Let me first tell you what you have to explain. (Laughter.) On September 3, 1894, the noble lord said the then important question was whether a new road should be made to Peshawar, and evidently he did not know at the time that the old road was made by us. That, I think, is clear. Then on February, 17, 1896, he said the Government—his Government—had succeeded in making a road from Peshawar to Chitral. That is the second declaration. He still thinks he has made the road. But at Acton, on November 10, he comes forward and says he knows the very day on which he made the road, that on August 9, on behalf of the Government, he assented to the construction and maintenance of a road from Peshawar to Chitral. No doubt the noble lord will explain how this is consistent with the knowledge he always possessed, he says, but kept silence in order that we might commit ourselves. I would here observe that if he had kept silence the noble lord would not have committed himself. He should either keep silence or have better information. Those who are responsible for this war have been very anxious to give every reason except the true one. I confess I saw with some indignation the attempt at first to throw the blame upon the Amír. It was suggested that it had been stirred up by the Amír. That was an untrue charge, and a most mischievous and most dangerous charge. (Cheers.) The next thing they had recourse to is the bad language that has been used with reference to the Sultan by statesmen and people in this country. It is not very usual for Ministers to attack their colleagues in this way. What is the worst language that has ever been addressed to the Sultan? Why, when the Prime Minister of England on the great anniversary at the Guildhall imprecated the wrath of Heaven upon the Sultan of Turkey for his misdeeds and consigned him and all his Government to the fate that belongs to those upon whom the judgments of Providence descend. That was not the utterance of unimportant individuals, but the deserved and rightful denunciation of the Sultan by a man who claimed to represent the opinion of the people of England. That is put forward as the cause of the rising of these poor, ignorant, independent tribes. A more absurd, ridiculous, and improper statement I think I have never heard. (Hear, hear.) As we shall be called upon, I suppose, to avow what we believe to be the real cause, I would state it in the words of a man who has a right, if any man ever had, to speak upon it—Sir Neville Chamberlain. He said: "No nation is more alive than our own to the spirit of patriotism, but unfortunately, in my opinion, a notion prevails far too greatly among us that this sentiment of impulse is set aside as of no moment whenever we come into contact with it in others to whom we are opposed." Then speaking of the old, prudent policy of the Indian frontier, he says:— "A new departure has been embarked upon; outposts have been put forward inside the hills; permanent garrisons have been established on lands belonging to the tribesmen; valleys have been opened out and roads made with the object of letting them understand that they are no longer independent; but that they are at our mercy, and the whole system of intercourse with them has made them aware that the old order of things has passed away. It is these acts that have led the tribes to coalesce; it is this system that has taught them that union is strength, and has fanned a spirit of resistance that will be transmitted to future generations." That, I believe, is the cause which has led to this outbreak. Is it surprising that it should be so? Why, the mouthpiece of the forward policy, the Commander-in-Chief, the military member of the Council of India, comes forth in the midst of this contest and says:—"Civilisation and barbarism cannot exist side by side and at the same time peaceably as independent neighbours." What is the use of your talking of respecting the independence of the tribes when language of that character is held by the man who is Commander-in-Chief of the armies of India? He demands disarmament and control. That is the *mot d'ordre* of the forward party, and it is against that language and spirit and policy that we are determined to protest. Then it is said, "Oh, it was all fanaticism." Yes, but we knew there were fanatical tribes through whose country we were driving a road and fortifying it for 150 miles, and the documents of the mullahs showed that all this fanaticism was set agoing and its strength derived from the fact of this fortified road, which they pointed out to the people as

being an invasion of their independence. The noble lord in February, 1896, said the tribes were delighted; that they desired nothing so much as to be incorporated under British rule. But the documents ought to have taught him exactly the opposite, because what did the tribes who had assented say? "For Heaven's sake give us troops to defend us against all the tribes around us who are hostile to us because we are friendly to you." Nothing comes out so conspicuously, not only in this campaign, but in many that have preceded it, as the extraordinary ignorance of the forward party of the conditions of the great problem with which they have to deal. No doubt they believed that these tribes would be faithful. But nothing was better known than that they are fickle, and a great part of the ground of our decision was the fickleness of these tribes when you had got them. This war, unhappy as it has been, is to be renewed. We have had a proclamation from the Commander-in-Chief that he is going back again to conquer the Afridis. "The lion of Britain is going back to subdue the flies of the Afridis." Unwise language, as unwise as all the language of the forward party. Is that your policy? If it is, I denounce it as a dangerous and an unjust policy. (Prolonged cheering.) I hope it is not your policy. I believe the seriousness of the events that have occurred in the last six months have sobered the mind of the Government in India and of the Government at home. The noble lord, who always lives in paradise, is always confident. He was confident that the tribes were friendly and would always be so.

Lord G. Hamilton: I did not go as far as that.

Sir W. Harcourt: Oh, not quite so far as that. Now he has changed his view. The tribes are unfriendly, but they have been punished, and they are subdued and submissive. The noble lord is quite as mistaken now. Mr. Thorburn, in his book, gives an account of the terrible punishments which you inflicted on the Orakzais in successive years. That was written in 1894; and in 1896 and 1897 the Orakzais were in arms against you again. What, then, is the good of your talking of having subdued them, and of their being permanently submissive. There is no reason to say that the punishments you talk of and the acceptance of your terms for the moment give you any security whatever. In the flush of his triumph at the poll in 1895, speaking of Chitral, the First Lord of the Treasury said, "Where the British soldier has gone, there he shall remain." Is that your policy? Are you going to remain in Tirah? After the experience of this year I think you will hold very different language to that. When you talk of prestige, do you mean that you are going to occupy all those valleys in which Sir William Lockhart has been operating, and in which so many valuable lives have been sacrificed? I believe not. I fully expect the Government will have come to the conclusion—and if they do so, no people will be happier than we—to put a stop to this forward policy—(cheers)—and to prevent the military element in India and England forcing it upon prudent statesmen. (Cheers.)

Mr. Balfour, in the course of his speech, said: Now I will say a word about India. An opportunity is to be given to the House to discuss the matter fully before the debate on the Address is brought to a conclusion. The right hon. gentleman has been good enough to warn us as to the line which his friends are going to take in their attack. I return the courtesy and warn him of the line we shall take, or some of the arguments we shall use in the defence. He appears to be determined to rest the whole of his case on the supposed connexion of our Chitral policy with the rising of the tribes. I hope we may not have to hammer out that question again. Putting aside the quarrel between that side and this on the point of honour, it is really too absurd to come down and say now that these tribes had a legitimate grievance against what we did, inasmuch as they voluntarily came forward to keep the road which the right hon. gentleman and his friends made for military reasons, and which, I hope, will for ever remain between Peshawar and the outposts of Chitral. And if you want practical confirmation of that fact you will find it in this—that of the total distance between Peshawar and Chitral, which is 180 miles, the actual distance along the road over which these disturbances took place was comparatively trifling—ten miles, I think—and they never spread further, never went to the tribes further up the valley, more in the direction of Chitral. I should have thought that, if there had been a general rising among the tribes along our border in consequence of our action on the Chitral road, surely the tribes bordering that road would have been themselves principally concerned. One other observation on the Chitral question only remains, and it is that the question before us in 1895 was not whether we should occupy Chitral, but whether we should abandon it; and one of the strongest reasons for not abandoning it was that there were tribes along that route who had helped the right hon. gentleman and his friends, and that to abandon Chitral meant the abandonment of those friendly allies. (Cheers.) We talk of good faith and the obligations of honour. I can conceive of no obligation of good faith and honour more binding on any Government than that of preserving those who had stood by us in our time of stress. (Renewed cheers.) But I may inform the right hon. gentleman that when the debate comes on in connexion with a vote on the Address it will not be confined, and cannot be confined, to the question of Chitral alone. He has told us the question is one between a forward and a backward policy. In that he unquestionably contradicted a statement by Lord Kimberley a few days ago, in which he said it was not a question between a backward and a forward policy, and in which he goes on to say that the Ministry of which he was a member deliberately adopted a more forward policy, and that the Liberal Government was responsible for it. That was a statement made by the leader of the right hon. gentleman's party in the House of Lords. But I take very little interest in putting side by side the inconsistent statements of these two distinguished colleagues. There is a far more important difficulty which the right hon. gentleman will have to get over than mere utterances from a public platform. It was in the Tochi Valley that the first disturbances occurred. In 1894 the question came before the Indian Government and before the Secretary of State for India of that day, the right hon. gentleman the member for Wolverhampton, as to the policy to be pursued. Now the Durand agreement had completed the delimitation between the Afghan and British spheres of influence. The question was anxiously discussed, and the Governor-General and military members of the Council were in favour of occupying advanced posts. The civilian members took the opposite view. They wrote a lengthy and able note expressing their dissent from the despatch of the majority. That long minute was enclosed by the Viceroy together with the opinions of the majority. I can imagine that the decision between these two policies was a matter of anxious and prolonged deliberation, but the right hon. gentleman did go in for a forward policy, and when we come to this motion the right hon. gentleman will have to deal, not only with what is urged on this side, but with some of his most distinguished colleagues on that bench. (Hear, hear.) It remains true at this moment as to those very difficulties that the opponents of the forward policy entered into every single one of those engagements which made it necessary that we should occupy these border posts. I have given the right hon. gentleman the kind of arguments he will have to meet when this debate comes on. He was good enough to indicate what his friends will say; I have told him some of the things which my noble friend and others will say; and I frankly admit that, in my judgment, the more the House surveys this question in all its bearings the more they will feel that, unhappy as this war is from the cost it has produced of valuable lives and much-needed treasure, not only was it absolutely necessary that we should engage in it, but the responsibility for the situation to which all those results are due is a responsibility which I am glad to divide with hon. and right hon. gentlemen opposite, but which on any fair estimate is far more on their shoulders than on ours. (Cheers.)

Mr. S. Smith expressed the deep apprehension felt by the Native population of India for the very costly and iniquitous war in which we were engaged, and which was pressing so sorely on the people of that country. His own party, he admitted, were not free from responsibility in this matter, but the Conservative party had much more responsibility. During the last twenty years a sum variously estimated between 50 and 70 millions had been expended upon frontier wars and military railways and works. That enormous sum had been wrung out of a population where the average income was £2 per head per annum. The late Sir H. Havelock-Allan had stated that the chief cause of our troubles with the hill tribes was the enhancement of the salt duties. The present frontier war was the outcome of the disastrous policy of the last twenty years. Throughout India there was but one opinion—that this forward policy had been a great mistake. The great Lord Lawrence would have opposed it, and Sir David Barbour, Sir Auckland Colvin, Sir Lepel Griffin, and Sir Richard Temple were opposed to the policy which had led to the frontier wars. He should like to know the private opinion of Sir W. Lockhart about it. He doubted whether Sir W. Lockhart approved of it. Military opinion was divided, but civil opinion was almost unanimous in opposing this wild policy. It made the hill tribes detest us, and it was one of the best methods of facilitating any designs Russia might have upon India. There had recently been famine in India, where a famine was estimated to cost 12 millions of rupees. The plague was still ravaging the country, and, considering the impoverished condition of India, it was most unjust that it should have to bear the cost of this wasteful and most expensive frontier war. Up to the end of the year the cost of the war was estimated at three-and-a-half millions of rupees, but he believed it would be much nearer ten millions. The worst feature of the whole question was the growth of discontent in India. It could not be ignored, and it was most ominous. If the Government did not pay more attention to the feeling in India a time of great trouble was in store for this country. India had been suffering most cruelly. What she needed was sympathy, and not oppressive legislation like that just introduced. If the Government at home would make a handsome grant to India, accompanied by words of kindness and sympathy, it would be one of the wisest investments this country ever made.

Sir L. McIver appealed to private members to dissociate themselves from "the Front Bench methods" of treating Indian questions. In Indian matters both Front Benches were past praying for. Whatever the private convictions of Ministers and ex-Ministers they were at once subordinated to the purposes of party recrimination. India was used only as a stick with which to beat political opponents. The real question in relation to the frontier of India was, not whether any particular step in the forward movement had been taken by this or that Cabinet, but what was the future policy to be, and by what fixed principles was it to be guided? If the Front Benches were incapable of discussing Indian matters without thinking of party, they were equally impotent to assert the best intentions they might have towards India in the face of the strong forward party in India itself. The Blue-book showed that the Secretary of State, whoever he might be, would have to struggle, and struggle quite hopelessly, and yet he would be induced by this despatch, or compelled by the circumstances of the moment, to concede one point after another until, before he knew where he was, he would find himself committed to a policy which in his own heart he had been resisting and reprobating. It was the persistency and the importunity of the local authority which made havoc with the Parliamentary theory of Cabinet responsibility with the policy of India. He did not deny that there existed a forward movement, and he understood its meaning to be aggression, but in a very limited sense. It no longer meant an attack on Afghanistan or an immediate occupation of Kandahar, and no one wanted to go to Herat. It was, it seemed to him, a constant series of attacks, of aggression, upon the territory of independent tribes, and, if it had a logical aim at all, it meant the final subjugation of that territory. If that were so, he said at once it was a wicked aim, it was an unprofitable object, and still more it was an impossible undertaking. (Opposition cheers.) Such an aim would be repudiated, with all sincerity, in the Punjab, at Calcutta, and in the India Office, but that did not prevent the process of the forward school going on. It did go on, all along the frontier, constantly, persistently. Curiously enough, this evil thing was being carried on by one of the finest and most conscientious bodies the

possessed—their frontier officers in India. But behind them were the real forwards—the high military mandarins of India. It was amongst these distinguished officers that the forward policy resided; and they were only too willing to utilise the zeal of the frontier officers and to regard the necessities of those officers as their opportunity. That he believed to be the truth of the mistakes into which successive Governments had been dragged. When the Government of India, under pressure of the continual urging of the forward party, began operations, for one reason or another, in the territory of the independent tribes, one inevitable answer was given to any suggestion that we should withdraw—our prestige with our own people in India and our honourable obligations to the tribes across the frontier who had been friendly to us during the operations. He agreed that that was an honourable answer against withdrawal; but what he objected to was that we should ever have placed ourselves in a position which made that answer valid, and he urged that whenever we could honourably retire, we should get out of these territories as soon as possible. From apparently harmless first steps the work went gradually on until considerable military movements and increase of responsibility were involved, and when in Parliament attention was drawn to the strain upon the resources of India, and the demand made that we should retire from an untenable and unjustifiable position, the reply usually was that reasons of prestige and honourable obligations to friendly nations prevented our doing this. By insidious methods one Secretary after another was dragged at the heels of the military party. Without any party purpose, and not throwing blame on one Secretary of State more than on another, and recognising the difficulties of their position, he appealed to the House to assert itself in this matter. He implored the House to resist the introduction of partisanship into the discussion of Indian questions, but to fairly treat them in a dispassionate way, to prevent further mischief through the aggressive action of the military party. (Hear, hear.) Let such matters be discussed apart from the question whether this or that Cabinet happened to have nominal control over our frontier policy at a given time, but with a view to establishing with the authority the House possessed the limits within which our action on the Indian frontier should be restrained. (Hear, hear.)

Sir C. Dilke said the hon. member in his able and interesting speech had to some extent anticipated the discussion of the amendment of which notice had been given by the leader of the Opposition. On that part of the frontier to which public attention had turned, there had been one frontier officer for 18 years, and unbroken peace for a period of 15 years. It was a very curious fact that in a month from the date of the removal of Colonel Warburton fighting began. It would appear that personal influence had much to do with the preservation of peace there. Upon an amendment in reference to the whole frontier question, it would not, perhaps, be the best opportunity to discuss the military situation, and if the discussion was to be anticipated, there was one branch of the subject upon which a few words should be said, and that was the military policy for which the Government were responsible. He confessed he had not yet mastered the contents of the Blue-book, but it seemed to him that the military policy stood in great need of defence. For four months after we were driven from the Khyber Pass no attempt was made to restore British authority there, but instead of that some 60,000 men and 40,000 animals were collected at enormous cost for operations in other valleys. After these months the recapture of the pass was a matter of great difficulty. The scale of operations and the delay and expenditure occasioned stood in great need of defence.

Sir E. Ashmead Bartlett said that recent events in India ought to have taught the Government the fatuity of pursuing an anti-Mussulman policy.

Wednesday, February 9.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

PETITIONS PRESENTED.

East India (Contagious Diseases).—Petitions against State regulation. From Harrogate, Saffron Walden, and Penrith Biggar. To lie upon the Table.

Varathanunthajee, Ry Vijiya.—Petition of Ry Vijiya Varathanunthajee, for redress of grievances. To lie upon the Table.

Nadar, Nalayuttoa.—Petition from Nalayuttoa Nadar, for redress of grievances. To lie upon the Table.

Nadar, Tykanoo.—Petition from Tykanoo Nadar, for redress of grievances. To lie upon the Table.

Naud, Nilya.—Petition from Nilya Naud, for redress of grievances. To lie upon the Table.

Parshad, Salgi.—Petition from Salgi Parshad, for enquiry into his case. To lie upon the Table.

Ram, Hauwaut.—Petition from Hauwaut Ram, for redress of grievances. To lie upon the Table.

Thursday, February 10.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE WAR BEYOND THE FRONTIER.

Major Rasch asked the Secretary of State for India, whether he would agree to a return of the number of men mobilised for field service in the frontier campaigns of 1897-8 who were left behind sick, showing those suffering from venereal disease or its effects, and the number of men who broke down on service in the above campaigns from the same causes.

Lord G. Hamilton: I will ask the Government of India to prepare the return asked for by my hon. friend.

THE COST OF THE WAR.

Mr. Buchanan asked the Secretary of State for India, what had been the amount of expenditure to the present time on the military operations on the frontier.

Lord G. Hamilton: It is estimated that the cost of the military operations on the North-West Frontier of India, for the whole of the year 1897-98, will amount to about four crores of rupees, the equivalent in sterling of £2,541,000.

ET CAETERA.

Raghvendrao Rao has passed the M.D. Examination of the University of London.

Baba Makhan Singh Sodi (London Hospital), having passed the necessary examinations, has been admitted a Member of the Royal College of Surgeons of England (M.R.C.S.).

Mr. Mahalanobis, B.Sc. Edinburgh, has been appointed Demonstrator in Physiology in Cardiff College.

In the December Examination at the Coopers' Hill College, Ahmed Ali stood 2nd, and R. K. Nariman 4th, among the Engineer Students, and Sunder Singh was first of the three Telegraph Students.

As the result of the recent Examinations held by the Council of Legal Education, the following were among the awards made:—Hilary Honours Examinations—Pass Certificate to Maung Tha Gywe. Pass Certificates: Lincoln's Inn—Hardeo Sahai Agarwala, Mohammad Azim, Abdul Aziz, Merwanjee Mancherjee, Merwanjee Bhownaggree, Tribhovandas Manekchand Doshi, Syed Ali Karim, Pandit Bishan Lal Kaul, Bhalabhai Bhailalbhai Patel, Jeshingbhai Bhaibabhai Patel, Paul P. Pillai, Mohanlal Jivanlal Vakil; Inner Temple—Nalina Kanta Banerjee, Shivalinga Chambasappa Hosali, Phiroze Behramji Malabari, Rustum Dossabhoy Nusserwanjee Wadia; Middle Temple—Manilal Motichand Doshi, Sheikh Ahmad Hussain, Deep Narayan Singh; Gray's Inn—Bijay Kisor Acharyya, Ali Akbar Hussanally, Mahatab Singh.

Sir Andrew Clarke, Agent-General for Victoria, has received advice from his Government to the effect that an Order in Council has been placed in the Colony prohibiting the importation of the following from India, or by vessels calling at any port in India: Sheep, cattle, and other ruminant animals, meat, skins, hides, hoofs, horns, hay, straw, fodder. Similar regulations are also enforced in regard to Africa and Java.

The National Indian Association announces that on Wednesday afternoon, February 16, a lecture will be delivered in the Indian Conference Room of the Imperial Institute, on Omar Khaiyam (the astronomer-poet of Persia), by Mr. B. B. Nagarkar, of Bombay (Delegate to the Chicago Parliament of Religions). Sir Alfred C. Lyall, G.C.I.E., K.C.B., will take the chair at 4.30.

The Secretary of State for India in Council has expressed cordial approval of the objects of the Indian Heroes' Fund, which has been inaugurated to recognise suitably the gallantry displayed by the native Indian troops in the Indian frontier campaigns, and the Duke of Abercorn has joined the Committee. Sir William Ward has also joined the Working Committee of the Fund as a representative of the Indian Civil Service, and General R. S. Hill as a representative of the Goorkha officers. Sir H. Seymour King, M.P., has accepted the office of Honorary Treasurer to the Fund, for which Messrs. Henry S. King and Co., 4, Pall Mall, and Messrs. Grindlay and Co., 55, Parliament Street, are now receiving subscriptions.

Even Sir Michael Hicks Beach (says the *Daily News*) can be parsimonious when there are no votes to be bought. The natives of India are not represented in Parliament, and therefore they will be charged with the entire cost of a war in which they have no conceivable interest, and which can bring them no conceivable advantage. The owners of sugar estates in the West India islands are influential persons, and therefore they must be consulted. Mr. Chamberlain apparently intends to give them a bounty.

At last (says the *Investors' Review*) the bill which is to ease the transaction of commercial affairs in India has become law. Thanks to it, Indian exporters may now buy exchange on London, when they cannot help themselves, at the lofty price of anything over 1s. $4\frac{3}{32}$d. per rupee. The Government now in Calcutta will accept deposits of gold in London, and the India Council here will telegraph out to it to give rupees—silver and paper—to banks on the spot against this gold, so that there may be no lack of currency. This is capacity and statesmanlike foresight for you, and it is sure to be deeply appreciated by all Indian bankers and merchants. True, we have not yet heard of any deposits of gold made for this purpose; true also is it that Indian exports are being choked as with a viper's grip by the artificially elevated rate of exchange; but these are passing inconveniences, sure to be removed by the high wisdom now made manifest. May we not, then, offer our profoundest admiration to those enlightened bureaucrats on the skill and resource they are displaying in steering India, not exactly through, but towards the most stupendous economic crisis in her history under British rule? "We are all tight and snug now," as the sparrow said when she built her nest in the house gutter.

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